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ABSTRACT
Essays on the Economics of Parking and Mixed Oligopoly
Tariq Sultan
Ph.D., Dissertation, June 2018
Supervisor: Associate. Prof. Eren ·Inci
Keywords: parking; congestion pricing; value of time; mixed duopoly; endogenous
timing; information acquisition.
This dissertation comprises of three chapters. In the rst chapter, we investigate
the existence of self-nancing and Pareto-optimal parking pricing scheme by devel-
oping a simple static model in which travelers, di¤ering in terms of the value of time,
optimally choose between the car and public transit as well as trip duration. To
curb congestion, public authorities charge parking fee per unit of time. We derive
condition(s) which may ensure the pricing scheme to be both Pareto-optimal and
self-nancing in the sense that no external funds are required. Numerical results,
when the value of time follows some specic rational functional form have also been
reported that guarantees the existence of Pareto-optimal and self-nancing price
scheme. In the second chapter, we contribute to the literature on endogenous tim-
ing in a mixed duopoly, where a public rm is competing against a domestic private
rm, by exploring the role of information advantage by a rm to act as a market
leader in a quantity setting game. We nd that under asymmetric information,
both type of Stackelberg equilibria with either rm acting as a leader coexist only
for the low variance of the demand shock. However, under high variance, only one of
the rms acquires costly information which helps it to endogenously act as a market
leader. In the third chapter, we allow the public rm to have a foreign-owned private
competitor. We nd that when the foreign-owned private rm is informed, multiple
equilibria co-exist and under high uncertainty only the public rm acquires costly
information and endogenously acts as a market leader.
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ÖZET
Parklanman¬n Ekonomisi ve Karma Oligopol Piyasalar Hakk¬nda
Makaleler
Tariq Sultan
Doktora Tezi, Haziran 2018
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Doç. Dr. Eren ·Inci
Anahtar Kelimeler: parklanma; s¬k¬¸s¬kl¬k yatland¬rmas¬; zaman de¼geri; karma
oligopol; içsel zamanlama; bilgi toplama.
Bu tez üç bölümden olus¸maktad¬r. ·Ilk bölümde, farkl¬zaman de¼gerlerine sahip seya-
hat eden ki¸silerin bulundu¼gu ve bu ki¸silerin araba ve toplu tas¸¬ma aras¬nda, bununla
birlikte ulas¸t¬rma süresi konusunda seçim yapt¬¼g¬ basit bir statik model geli¸stir-
erek, kendi kendini nansman¬n varl¬¼g¬n¬ve Pareto-optimal park ücretlendirilmesinin
tasla¼g¬n¬aras¸t¬r¬yoruz. Modelde, trak yo¼gunlu¼gunu azaltmak ad¬na, kamu taraf¬n-
dan zamanla orant¬l¬olarak artan bir park ücreti tahsil edilmektedir. Parkland¬rma
tasla¼g¬n¬n Pareto-optimal olmas¬ve ayn¬zamanda kendi kendine nansman¬n, d¬¸sar-
dan bir nansmana gerek duymadan, var olmas¬için gerekli s¸artlar¬bu modelden
elde ediyoruz. Zaman de¼gerinin spesik fonksiyonel formlar¬ için Pareto-optimal
ve kendi kendine nansman¬sa¼glayan say¬sal analiz sonuçlar¬da rapor edilmi¸stir.
·Ikinci bölümde, bir yerel özel rmaya kar¸s¬bir kamu rmas¬n¬n rekabet etti¼gi, bir
üretim miktar¬belirleme oyunundaki rman¬n bilgi avantaj¬n¬n bu rman¬n pazar
lideri olmas¬ndaki rolünü aras¸t¬rarak, karma duopolideki rmalar¬n içsel zamanlama
kararlar¬literatürüne katk¬yap¬yoruz. Asimetrik bilgi alt¬nda, iki rmadan birinin
Stackelberg lideri olarak rol alabildi¼gi ard¬¸s¬k hamle dengelerinin ancak küçük dere-
cede talep s¸oku durumunda var oldu¼gunu görüyoruz. Di¼ger yandan, talep s¸okunda
yüksek varyans oldu¼gunda, rmalardan sadece birinin maliyetli bilgi elde etti¼gini ve
bu bilginin o rmanin içsel bir s¸ekilde pazar lideri olarak rol almas¬na yard¬m etti¼gini
görüyoruz. Üçüncü bölümde, kamu rmas¬n¬n rakibi olan özel rman¬n yabanc¬lara
ait olmas¬na izin veriyoruz. Yabanc¬lara ait özel rman¬n kamu rmas¬na k¬yasla
bilgi avantaj¬oldu¼gunda, birden fazla denge durumu var olmaktad¬r, ve yüksek be-
lirsizlik alt¬nda, sadece kamu rmas¬n¬n maliyetli bilgi elde ederek içsel bir s¸ekilde
pazar lideri olarak rol ald¬¼g¬n¬buluyoruz.
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CHAPTER 1
Trip duration, mode choice, and existence of Pareto-optimal and
self-nancing parking prices
1.1 Introduction
The modern day lifestyle has boosted car ownership rate among the societies.
Every car is required to be parked somewhere, at home, at the o¢ ce, at the shopping
mall, or at restaurants. In his landmark book The High cost of free parking,
Shoup (2005) writes that if the whole world achieve the car ownership rate of what
the United States had in 2000, there would be 4.7 billion cars, which would require
the whole world to provide parking area equivalent to the whole area of England or
Greece.1 In many parts of the world, we hardly pay for parking spaces. Parking
is provided freely by the employer if we go for the job, it is provided free when we
visit restaurants, and shopping malls also provide free parking (with few exceptions
of course) when we go for shopping.
Free provision of parking has resulted in extensive use of automobiles and every
vehicle on road contribute to the negative congestion externality on others. With
the increase in the ownership of vehicles, lots of problems have emerged in the
form of road congestion, pollution, and energy scarcity etc. According to some
reasonable estimates, OECD (2014) reports that road transport has contributed
nearly $1 trillion in the year 2010 towards the cost of air pollution to OECD member
states.2 There have been many suggestions to get rid of these sort of problems
to be incorporated into transport and environmental policies. Out of these many
1If we assume that each car requires four parking spaces, then Shoup (2005) claims that it
would require the whole world to provide parking space equivalent to that of France or Spain.
2Total cost of air pollution was estimated to be $1.7 trillion including both deaths and health
e¤ects. Air pollution costed Turkey $38,725 million in the year 2005 and $58,548 million in the
year 2010 and caused 28045 and 28924 deaths in years 2005 and 2010, respectively (OECD, 2014).
1
suggestions, relevant to this study is to devise policies that should curb auto use and
to make a signicant investment in the public transportation system (e.g, OECD,
2014).
In order to get a remedy to these problems, a signicant amount of research has
been produced. It cannot be underestimated that how free parking aggravates these
problems, in addition, however, it creates other problems like biasedness towards
the choice of a car against public transportation.3 Istanbul is ranked sixth in world
cities in terms of worst tra¢ c jams and congestion.4 Overall almost 49 percent of
free ow travel time (uncongested situation) is wasted on roads due to congestion.
While extra 63 and 91 percent of free ow travel time is required to travel during
the morning peak and evening peak rush hours respectively and much extra time
is wasted on the road due to tra¢ c congestion. In principle, politicians and public
consider the problem of congestion to be very serious that needs a prompt solution.
However, less than the marginal social cost of road pricing has led to ine¢ cient use
of di¤erent transport modes thus contributing to the problem than remedy.
Parking policy has been used as a demand management policy to combat with
problem of congestion and to deal with the unnecessary delays. There has been
issues regarding the acceptability of parking policy among public and political elite.
Results from several survey studies in the literature across di¤erent parts of world
show that commuters or road users may accept the congestion pricing in the form
of a road or parking toll, if they can be sure about the redistribution of the toll
revenue towards improving the road infrastructure, better public transportation and
reductions in fuel and car ownership taxes.
With the growth in urbanized population, the demand for public transporta-
tion has increased tremendously thus leading to crowdedness in these public ser-
vices. Contribution towards crowdedness when one gets into the public transit, has
the property of reciprocal negative externality, in the same way as in road conges-
tion, therefore it should be priced e¢ ciently. Using a survey data on Paris subway,
Prudhomme et al. (2012) estimated that eight percent increase in the passengers
per square meters during the period from 2002 to 2007 imposed a welfare loss of at
least euro 75 million in the year 2007.5 Another study based on survey data on Paris
subway, by Haywood and Koning (2013) estimated the welfare cost of a passenger
that has a seat in the transit. Their nding reveals that under the highly congested
situations this cost increase from euro 2.42 to euro 3.69 for such passengers.
But the issue of crowdedness in public services has not gained as much attention
3Gillen (1977) shows how parking cost a¤ects the mode choice.
4Source: https://www.tomtom.com/en_gb/tra¢ cindex/
5In case of Melbourne, Austrailia, Veitch, Partridge and Walker (2013) estimated that in the
year 2011, crowding in the city trains has imposed a yearly cost of about 208 million euros.
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as the road congestion. While considering the issue of crowding in public transit,
de Palma et al. (2015) study the impact of time-varying transit fare to resolve this
issue. In their model, commuters have the exibility to delay or schedule their trips
early to avoid crowding discomfort but face a scheduling cost. With this tradeo¤,
they analyze three fare regimes, no fare, a uniform fare and a train dependent (time-
varying) fare and show that crowdedness can never be vanished completely even if
fully exible fare regime is implemented since all transit trains are assumed to have
some degree of crowdedness. They nd that when crowding cost function is convex
and train capacity to carry passengers is xed, welfare gains from implementing
time-varying fare decreases with the increase in the number of commuters. By
endogenizing the number and capacity of trains, they nd that optimal time-varying
fares may result in higher numbers and capacity of trains compared to the uniform
form fares. They conclude that existing transit services can be better utilized with
congestion pricing. They calibrated their model for Paris RER A line and estimated
a welfare gain of euro 0.27 and euro 0.45 per user with implementing optimal uniform
fare and optimal time-varying fare, respectively.
Generally, it is thought that congestion pricing, whether in the form of road usage
fee or parking fee benets the richer segment of the society, hence raising questions
from an equity point of view. As far as equity is concerned, there is a di¤erence of
opinion among economists and planning experts because they divide di¤erent groups
on the basis of a di¤erent set of indicators. Economists, for example, take income
as the basis, on the other hand, planning literature denes groups on a broader base
such as identifying a disadvantaged group as far the availability of public services is
concerned. While formulating a congestion policy, care should be taken to properly
address di¤erent groups vulnerable to that scheme and local conditions and which
aspect of equity is under consideration, may also be kept in mind.6
The literature encompasses four type of equity: horizontal equity, vertical equity,
the cost principle and the benet principle. Horizontal equity states that individuals
of same classes may be treated alike in terms of tax payments and vertical equity,
broadly speaking states that individuals of di¤erent groups of the society may be
treated di¤erently which provides, among others, one justication for progressive
taxes. According to the cost principle of equity, the ones who contribute more to
the social cost should bear it and the benet principle states that who enjoys the
social benet, should pay for it.
In this paper, we study a simple and static bi-modal, single origin-destination
model similar to one in Liu et al. (2009) and Nie and Liu (2010). In our model, we
allow travelers to optimally choose trip length/duration to maximize their utility
6For a detailed discussion on the issue of equity of congestion pricing and to see the main
messages of the literature, see for example Ecola and Light (2009).
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and to deal with the issue of congestion, local authorities impose a per unit of time
parking charge. We believe that charging per unit of time parking fee may provide
the authorities with more exibility to collect and use of revenue and may face
less opposition both from the public and political circles in terms of its acceptance.
Normally it is hard for the public to accept a congestion charge on the existing lanes
than on the new ones. The issue of equity is addressed by redistributing the revenue
collected from parking to the ones who have been a¤ected by the imposition of
parking charges. We dene the system performance in terms of total system travel
time and derive the general conditions under which a per unit of time parking prices
are both Pareto-improving, in the sense that everyone is better o¤ in terms of travel
time and self-nancing (no external funds are required). From Pareto-improving or
Pareto-optimality, we mean that no single traveler is worse-o¤ in terms of travel time
and from self-nancing we mean that in order to implement Pareto-optimal parking
prices, the govt. subsidizes the public transit in a way that no external funds are
required.7 We further discuss what happens to the existence of Pareto-improving
and self-nancing per unit of time parking pricing scheme, when the distribution
of the value of time takes di¤erent functional forms (i.e., concave, linear, rational
etc.). We undertake a numerical exercise when the value of time distribution takes
the form of a rational function of the rst order of di¤erent shape and report that
such scheme exists.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We review literature in Section 1.2
and discuss model formulation in Section 1.3 and derive the main results in section
1.4. Section 1.5 discusses the numerical exercise and reports the results and Section
1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The economic literature on road congestion pricing is not scant but the literature
on parking pricing to curb congestion has not gained the deserved attention. To
have a glimpse of the literature on the economics of parking see Inci (2015). In
this section, we briey review studies on congestion pricing and their acceptability
among politicians and public. Giuliano (1992) highlights the importance of the issue
of the tra¢ c congestion and how the U.S transportation policy has incorporated
the urgency of the congestion issue. The author identies the winners and losers
segments of the population from the congestion pricing and argues that the list of
7Since govt. needs funds to compensate the group of travelers who have been shifted from
driving cars to use public transit.
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loser group can be minimized or completely eliminated if the toll is applied on the
newly added facility rather than applying it to the existing facilities.8 He goes on
further to discuss the potential ways for successful implementation of pricing policy
and concludes that priority may be given to raising the public acceptance even if
a compromise to some extent over the economic e¢ ciency of the system has to be
made. Giuliano (1994) also recognizes the fact that it is di¢ cult to address all the
equity concerns of congestion pricing because it is a¤ected by numerous factors. A
policy may fulll the criteria of equity and fairness from ones perspective but it
may not be of such standards from the point of view of direct a¤ectees of the pricing
scheme.
Using survey data, Ubbels and Verhoef (2006) empirically investigated the hur-
dles in the acceptance of road pricing in Dutch road users who are usually exposed
to congestion. They observed a very low level of acceptance of road pricing at its
own but however, acceptance level of pricing policy may rise if it is accompanied by
the use of revenue to remove or reduce car ownership tax, gasoline taxes and to im-
prove road networks. The commuters with higher education level and higher value
of time found pricing policy to be more justied since this subpopulation receives
the highest benets in terms of time savings. And perception about how a policy
can reduce the congestion may a¤ect the acceptance.
While considering heterogeneity in terms of the value of time among road users
to evaluate di¤erent congestion pricing policies, Small and Yan (2001) show that
with the moderate level of heterogeneity, second best pricing policy achieves only
16 to 33 percent (approximately) of welfare level of what is being achieved through
rst-best pricing scheme. Interestingly, a robust result with respect to the level of
heterogeneity reveals that revenue-maximizing produces an outcome in the form of
higher prices but achieves lower welfare level compared with what is being attained
by second best pricing policy. The authors recognize the importance of heterogene-
ity of value of time to improve the e¤ectiveness of partial pricing scheme through
product di¤erentiation in the periods of high demand and congestion.
Many studies have ignored the important issue of heterogeneity of value of time
among the commuters. For example, Adler and Cetin (2001) developed a model
with a single origin-destination pair connected via two routes with homogeneous
commuters having a constant value of time. They analyzed the congestion pricing
schemes on a desirable road(congested) during peak rush hours to divert the com-
muters to the less desirable road(relatively less congested and have ample capacity).
The revenue generated from the tolled road is directly redistributed to the users of
the less desirable road which may help eliminate equity concerns over congestion
8This is being said keeping in view of the policy failures of 1-10 (Santa Monica Freeway)
Diamond Lanein Los Angeles and Bostons Southeast Expressway HOV lane.
5
pricing among the public. In this way, they show that travel costs for everyone
declines and the system can get rid of waiting time in the lines on roads.
To deal with the road congestion, Glazer and Niskanen (1992) analyze the park-
ing prices, when the road usage is underpriced or not priced at all. When roads are
not properly priced, they argue that a lump sum parking fee may improve welfare
while hourly or per unit of time parking fee can not. This is because, in their model,
the increase in per unit of time parking fee induces parkers to park for shorter dura-
tion and leave the parking spaces more frequently thus inviting others to park and
hence contributing towards the higher level of congestion. When roads are e¢ ciently
priced, they show that marginal cost parking price (per unit of time) is optimal and
their models yield no lump sum parking fee. Their model ignores the heterogeneity
among consumers in terms of the value of time which is very important when evalu-
ating the parking prices from an equity perspective. Since the value of time-saving
from reduced congestion is of more worth to rich than the less privileged segment of
society, so any policy aimed at reducing congestion favors those who have the high
value of time. Therefore the distribution of proceeds from parking charges or road
tolls has signicant importance as suggested in many studies, some have been cited
above. De Borger and Russo (2017) show that how local retailers lobby the city
governments to inuence the parking pricing policies to remain below the e¢ cient
pricing.
Arnott et al. (1994) argue that congestion (in the form of queuing) on roads can
be eliminated if a proper toll scheme depending on time is implemented. They also
shed light on the importance of the distribution of the toll revenues and they claim
that if toll revenue is not redistributed then its benets are regressive that benets
only rich segment of the society.
Nourinejad and Roorda (2017) argue that hourly parking fee does not always
increase demand, in fact, it can decrease or increase the parking demand depending
upon the dwell time elasticity with respect to parking price per unit of time. Demand
increases when such elasticity is high, it may increase or decrease when dwell time
is inelastic. The authors recommend that a wise parking policy should incorporate
dwell time elasticity since the nature of parking pricing is of fundamentally di¤erent
to the road pricing because the later always dampens tra¢ c demand when it is
raised.
The self-nancing principle of Mohring and Harwitz (1962) has a great impor-
tance in the literature of transportation economics. Using several assumptions9,
they show that road capacity costs can be just recovered from toll charges (i.e. self-
9They use a single origin-destination pair linked with one route, road users are homogeneous
in terms of the value of time, toll charges and capacity are choice variables, capacity cost function
as linear and their congestion function possess homogeneous of degree zero property.
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nancing roads) and it can be welfare improving. To see the robustness of their
results by relaxing di¤erent assumptions implied in Mohring and Harwitz (1962), a
lot of literature on self-nancing emerged after.10 Verhoef and Mohring (2009) re-
view the follow-up literature on self-nancing roads that investigate the relationship
between proceeds from road toll and costs associated with roads. They also pro-
vide guidance for the social planner when considering the self-nancing principle of
Mohring and Harwitz (1962) to device toll policy. On the basis of numerical results
reported in the paper, they argue that while interpreting this principle, mixing up of
capital costs with investment costs and imposing balanced budget restrictions when
networks are operating under second-best conditions, may result in welfare losses.
Our study is closely related to Liu et al. (2009) and Nie and Liu (2010). Liu et
al. (2009), while considering two modes (car and public transit) and a single origin
and destination pair derived the conditions for the existence of Pareto-improving
and revenue-neutral congestion pricing schemes. Revenue neutral in the sense that
tolling authority uses the proceeds from the tolls on roads collected as a xed charge
per user to subsidize the public transit users as a lump sum while keeping in view
the objective of reducing congestion in an equitable way. While deriving the above
said conditions, they took into account the general distribution of the value of time
among the travelers population. But for a uniform distribution of the value of
the time, they show that Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral congestion pricing
schemes always exists for any target level of road users that improves the system
performance in terms of total system travel time reduction. Since the value of time
of the person indi¤erent between the two modes is critical, they show that a higher
value of time for this commuter, representing higher inequality, is useful to resolve
the issue of inequity. On the other hand, Nie and Liu (2010) by using the same
model settings as in Liu et al. (2009), derived the conditions for the existence
of self-nancing and Pareto-improving congestion tolling scheme while abandoning
the requirement of revenue neutrality. They show that Liu et al. (2009) result is
highly dependent on the shape of the distribution of the value of time and with
a general type of distribution it may just not be possible for a pricing scheme to
be Pareto-optimal without external funds requirement. They revealed that Liu et
al. condition is satised as long as the distribution is concave in nature. In this
paper, the existence conditions are also derived when the value of time distribution
10For example, Strotz (1964) relaxed the homogeniety of the road users in terms of value of
time. Arnott and Kraus (1995) and Yang and Meng (2002) extended the basic set up of single link
of Mohring and Harwitz (1962) to multiple links. Oum and Zhang (1990) uses the more realistic
nature of road capacity being discrete and Small (1999) departed from perfect competition environ-
ment. Kraus (1981) studied if the assumptions of linearity of capacity costs and the homogeniety
of degree zero of congestion fuctions are relaxed and Mouche et al.(2007) prvodied a well dened
mathematical proof of the self-nancing rule, are the few but not all papers to study self-nancing
principle.
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is of rst-order rational function type. They conclude that a toll scheme is Pareto-
improving only if it is revenue neutral or it is revenue maximizing. Here in this paper,
we derive the same existence condition as they do but we di¤er in two aspects. In
our analysis, toll authority charges a parking fee per unit of time to suppress car use
and ultimately to curb congestion and second, we allow the travelers to choose the
optimal trip duration. This is important because charging per unit of time parking
fee may force individuals to reduce their trip durations and hence we need to see
whether Pareto-optimal and self-nancing scheme still exists when by taking this
into account.
1.3 The Model
We provide a simple model in which travelers make a trip to downtown from a
xed origin located in suburbs.11 The number of trips (total demand) are represented
by D, which we assume to be xed exogenously. Individuals optimally choose trip
length (duration) and the mode of transportation between the car and public transit
(train or buses specied to run on separate lanes). An individual going to his
destination by car maximizes the following net utility function:
S(l) = V (l)   (N) [tc (Nc) + c(l) + l]  Fc (1)
We now discuss the elements of the S(l) above one by one. V (l) is the gross
utility obtained from spending l (trip length of duration) units of time on shopping
or recreation and we assume that V (l) exhibit standard properties. It is strictly
concave and increasing in its argument l such that there exists a unique solution to
the above problem.  (N) is value of time distribution function which we assume
is a continuous function and is di¤erent for di¤erent individuals. Let G() be the
distribution of  among individuals. G(k) is dened as number of individuals for
which value of time   k which ultimately leads to G(min) = D and G(max) =
0. tc (Nc) is the travel time on road when an individual decides to go by car. It
is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function of number of car drivers on the
road. c(l) is the time spent on searching for a parking lot at the destination which
we assume is a positive function of trip length.  (N) (tc (Nc) + c(l)) represents the
value of in-vehicle time and we also include the term l to represent the opportunity
11Since our focus in this research is to address the social inequity issues and we ignore the spatial
inequity issues.
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cost or time cost of the trip.12 Finally the term Fc represents the operating cost of
vehicle/car which may include for example fuel cost, insurance cost and wear and
tear cost. The rst-order condition of equation (1) with respect to l gives its unique
value at which objective function of car drivers is maximized and we represent it
by lc=nt, where the subscripts c and nt represents car users and no toll (without
any parking charges) respectively. V

lc=nt

is large enough such that the optimal
S

lc=nt

 0, otherwise individual prefers outside option of not to make the trip at
all. Hence, we have:
S
 
lc=nt

= V
 
lc=nt
   (N) tc (Nc) + c  lc=nt+ lc=nt  Fc  0 (2)
In the same fashion, an individual going to his destination by using public transit
maximizes the following net utility function S(l):
S(l) = V (l)   (N) [tb + l]  Fb (3)
where, V (l) ;  (N) ; and l are the same as discussed above and tb is the time spent
in public transit service en route to the destination. We assume that tb is xed
exogenously and transit service has enough capacity without creating potential con-
gestion13 and is operating at constant returns to scale technology. Further, it is
assumed that tb > tc (0) which means transit time is strictly longer than free ow
travel time by car. Fb represents xed cost associated with travel by public transit
which potentially may include the bus fare.
Lets represents the solution to the rst-order condition of (3) with respect to
l as lb=nt, where the subscripts b and nt represents transit(bus) users and no
toll respectively. And accordingly, we have the following optimized version of the
objective function S

lb=nt

 0:
S
 
lb=nt

= V
 
lb=nt
   (N) tb + lb=nt  Fb  0 (4)
By equating equations (2) and (4), we get the individual indi¤erent between
using either of the mode.
V
 
lb=nt
  V  lc=nt  e lb=nt   lc=nt+F = e tb   tc (Ne)  c  lc=nt (5)
12 (N) l represents the opportunity cost. For justication of this term see for example Arnott
and Inci (2006).
13To have a glimpse of the literature on cost of crowding in public transit and its remedies see,
for example, Prudhomme et al. (2012) and de Palma et al. (2015)
9
where Ne represents the number of car users in the absence of any toll scheme, e =
 (Ne) is the value of time of the indi¤erent user and F = Fc   Fb > 0 shows the
di¤erence between the operating costs of two modes which is assumed to be positive
because owning a car is expensive. The above condition is just like Wardrops rst
principle, which states that travelers continue to make choices between car and the
public transit until neither travel mode becomes strictly better than the other.
Now, we derive the indi¤erence condition when a public authority imposes a
parking charge per unit of time and charges/subsides the public transit. In the
similar fashion, we write the optimized objective function for the car drivers as
follows:
S
 
lc=t

= V
 
lc=t
   (N) tc (Nc) + c  lc=t+ lc=t  fc  lc=t  Fc  0; (6)
where lc=t is the optimal level of trip length chosen via optimization, where the
subscripts ct and t represents car users and toll respectively and fc > 0 is the
parking fee (toll) per unit of time. Similarly the optimized objective function for
transit (bus) riders after imposition of a toll scheme is:
S
 
lb=t

= V
 
lb=t
   (N) tb + lb=t  fb   Fb  0; (7)
where lb=t is the optimal level of trip length chosen via optimization process. Since
we are interested in Pareto-optimal toll scheme, fb may potentially be the transit
subsidy (i.e. fb  0). Now equating equations (6) and (7) yields the indi¤erence
equilibrium condition once after toll scheme is imposed:
V
 
lb=t
 V  lc=t p  lb=t   lc=t+fc  lc=t fb+F = p tb   tc (Np)  c  lc=t (8)
where Np is the number of car users after a parking charge (toll) is imposed and
p = (Np) is the value of time of the Npth individual.
Since our focus is to evaluate the toll scheme from equity point of view keeping
in mind the heterogeneity of the individuals in terms of value of time, there are three
groups of individuals after the imposition of toll.
1.3.1 Transit users
Those who use public transit(bus) before and after the toll, their optimal utility
changes by only fb. Pareto-optimality requires fb  0. Thus revenue neutrality or
10
self-nancing requires fc  0:
fb  0 & fc  0 (9)
1.3.2 Tolled o¤ from car
For this group of individuals who have been tolled o¤the car(road) (Np  N  Ne),
the change in their utility V (N) is as follows:
V (N) = V
 
lb=t
 V  lc=nt (N) tb   tc (Ne)  c  lc=nt  lc=nt + lb=t fb+F
(10)
Among this group, individual with value of time p, who is indi¤erent between
using car and transit after the toll is being imposed su¤ers the most. So if this
person receives enough subsidy such that V (Np)  0, then all of this group may
be better o¤. By using equation (5) and with some algebraic manipulation in the
above equation, we get:
fb  (V lb=t) V (lb=nt)+(e p)[tb tc(Ne) c(lc=nt)] p(lb=t lc=nt)+e(lb=nt lc=nt) < 0
(11)
1.3.3 Car users
This group of individuals(N  Np) remain as car users before and after the
imposition of toll, the change in their utility V (N) can be written as:
V (N) = V (lc=t) V (lc=nt)+p[tc (Ne) tc (Np)+c(lc=nt) c(lc=t)+lc=nt lc=t] fc(lc=t)
(12)
Among this group, individual with value of time p, receives the least benet
and Pareto-optimality require that V (Np)  0, hence we have :
fc

lc=t  V
 
lc=t
  V  lc=nt+ p tc (Ne)  tc (Np) + c  lc=nt  c  lc=t+ lc=nt   lc=t
(13)
Proposition 1 A parking price scheme makes everyone better o¤ i¤ followings are
met:
1. fb  V (lb=t)   V (lb=nt)   (e   p)[tb   tc (Ne)   c

lc=nt

]   p(lb=t   lc=nt) +
e(l

b=nt   lc=nt)
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2. fc

lc=t  V (lc=t)  V (lc=nt) + p[tc(Ne)  tc(Np) + c(lc=nt)  c(lc=t) + lc=nt   lc=t]
1.4 Revenue-neutral or self-nancing Toll System
Now dene the maximum revenue Imax that can be generated from the toll scheme
as follows:
Imax = fc
 
lc=t

Np + fb (D  Np)
where Np is number of car users and D Np is number of transit users after the toll
is being imposed. Using equations (9),(11) and (13), Imax can be written as:
Imax = Np[V
 
lc=t
  V  lc=nt+ p(tc(Ne)  tc(Np) + c(lc=nt)  c(lc=t) + lc=nt   lc=t)]
+ (D  Np)[V (lb=t)  V (lb=nt) + (e   p)(tb   tc(Ne)  c(lc=nt))]
+ (D  Np)[ p(lb=t   lc=nt) + e(lb=nt   lc=nt)] (14)
Denition 1 ( Pareto-optimal parking prices) A parking price scheme is Pareto-
optimal, or alternatively, it is Pareto-improving if all of the travelers are better-o¤
and no single traveler is worse-o¤ in terms of travel time.
Denition 2 (self-nancing parking prices) A parking price scheme is self-nancing
in a sense that the govt. does not require any external funds in order to implement
Pareto-optimal parking prices.
As prevalent in the transportation literature, we dene the system performance
in terms of total travel time, as follows:
Tnt = Ne
 
tc (Ne) + c
 
lc=nt

+ (D  Ne) tb; (15)
Tt = Np
 
tc (Np) + c
 
lc=t

+ (D  Np) tb; (16)
where Tnt and Tt represent the total system travel time without toll and toll re-
spectively and the above two equations are self explanatory. Using information in
equations (5), (9), (11), and (13) into (14) and using the above two equations (15)
and (16) along with some algebraic manipulation, we get the following equation for
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maximum revenue:
Imax =  pTt + pTnt +Np(V (lc=t)  V (lc=nt))  pNp(lc=t   lc=nt)
+

(D  Np)  p (D  Ne)
e

(V (lb=t)  V (lc=nt))  p(Ne  Np)(lb=t   lc=nt)
+
p (D  Ne)
e
(V (lb=t)  V (lb=nt))  p(D  Ne)(lb=t   lb=nt)
+

(D  Np)  p (D  Ne)
e

F (17)
The rst underlined term in the above equation represents the gross utility
gain/loss or alternatively recreational gain/loss of car users adjusted with opportu-
nity cost without taking into account the time saving due to imposition of parking
charges as it is already captured by the term Tt. The second underlined term shows
the gross utility gain/loss of those who have been tolled o¤ from using car adjusted
with opportunity cost and the third underlined term represents the utility gain/loss
of transit users adjusted with their respective opportunity cost. since self-nancing
requires Imax  0, so we have the following condition:
Tt  Tnt +F

D  Np
p
  (D  Ne)
e

+
Np
p
 
V
 
lc=t
  V  lc=nt Np  lc=t   lc=nt
+

D  Np
p
  D  Ne
e
 
V
 
lb=t
  V  lc=nt  (Ne  Np)  lb=t   lc=nt
+
(D  Ne)
e
 
V
 
lb=t
  V  lb=nt  (D  Ne)  lb=t   lb=nt (18)
In order to economize on notations, we will just write third term on the right hand
side of the above inequality asV(car users)(utility gain/loss of car users adjusted with
trip length) and forth term as V(tolled o¤ from car) and the last term as V(bus users).
Hence we, record above discussion as the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 (Self-nance and Pareto-optimal parking prices) For a given
targeted number of car users Np(after imposing parking charge), parking pricing
scheme always be both self-nancing and Pareto-optimal if the following condition
is satised:
Tt  Tnt+F

D  Np
p
  (D  Ne)
e

+V(car users)+V(tolled o¤ from car)+V(bus users)
The above condition is similar to one derived in Nie and Liu (2010) but it has
three additional terms since we allow travelers to decide on the duration of their trips
13
as well. To see the signs of the additional terms on the right-hand side for when F ()
is a general concave function needs a rigorous proof, which is beyond the scope of
the present study. We may di¤er with Nie and Liu (2010) if the sign comes out to be
negative which may be interesting and may indicate that a Pareto-optimal and self-
nancing parking pricing scheme may not exist without external funds or subsidy.
However, we provide some numerical results when the value of time distribution
F () follows a rst order rational function and our results ensure the existence of
Pareto-improving and self-nancing parking pricing scheme and our results are in
line with the one reported in Nie and Liu (2010). Since we have allowed travelers
to optimally decide on trip duration, we expect that charging parking fee per unit
of time may be more e¢ cient and can resolve the equity issues more e¤ectively if
not completely. It may also provide the authorities with more exibility to collect
and use of revenue and may face less opposition both from the public and political
parties in terms of its acceptance.
1.5 Numerical Exercise
In this section, we report some results from numerical exercise to see the ex-
istence of a Pareto-optimal and self-nancing parking pricing scheme when value
of time distribution follows a rst order rational function of the form F () =
D (max   ) = + max as used in Nie and Liu (2010), where  is value of time,
max is the maximum value it can take, D is total demand and  is a parameter.
We adopted some values from Nie and Liu (2010) such as F = 4, D = 1000,
max = 40, tb = 1:5 ,tc (Nc) = 0:75
 
1 + 0:15 (Nc=500)
5 to make the results com-
parable. We employ utility function as V (l) = 50 ln (1 + l), where number 50 is
used to make sure that benets are larger than costs, cruising for parking function
as c(l) = l=12.14 In the absence of any parking charges, the car user and bus users
optimize the equations (19) and (20) respectively, by choosing on trip length l:
(50) ln (1 + l)  

tc (Nc) +

1
12

l + l

  Fc (19)
(50) ln (1 + l)   (tb + l)  Fb (20)
And in the presence of parking charges, the car users and transit users optimize the
following functions as given in equations (21) and (22) respectively by choosing on
trip length l. We assume parking fee to be fc = =5 to make the numerical results
14We use cruising function to be linear just for tractability and convenience.
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tractable.
(50) ln (1 + l)  

tc (Nc) +

1
12

l + l

  l:fc   Fc (21)
(50) ln (1 + l)   (tb + l)  Fb   fb (22)
With  = 1:5 and using all the above information into equation (5), we get the
value of time of indi¤erent user to be e = 11: 218 and accordingly Ne = 506: 48 are
the car users in the absence of any parking charges, so individuals with value of time
  11: 218 will use cars. The systems total travel time as dened above in equation
(15) when there are 506: 48 numbers of car users, is calculated to be Tnt = 1312: 4.
Then we nd the range of the road users in which Tt < Tnt as (281: 57; 540: 68) and
their corresponding range of value of time as (10: 145; 20: 204). And lastly, we see
whether in this range, the condition reported in Proposition 2 is fullled or not to
ensure the existence of self-nancing and Pareto-optimal pricing scheme.
The table (1) below presents the values of di¤erent terms on right hand side
of the condition stated in Proposition 2 corresponding to di¤erent values of  in
the range, where Tt < Tnt, (10: 145; 20: 204) or accordingly the range of car users
(281: 57; 540: 68). By comparing the values in columns (3) and (4), we can observe
that for values of  in the range15 (13  14; 20: 204) or for the range of number of
car users between (281:57; 453:78  426:23), Proposition 2 is satised which guaran-
tees that for this user ow (number of car users) Pareto-optimal and self-nancing
parking pricing scheme exists. Similarly the results for the rational function with
values of  = 3:1 and  = 0:8 are reported below in tables (2) and (3) respectively.
For rational function with  = 3:1; the value of time of indi¤erent user is found
to be e = 10: 159 and accordingly Ne = 417:40 are the car users in absence of
parking charges, so individual with value of time   10: 159 will use cars. And by
looking at table (2), we can see that for values of  in the range (12  13; 15: 629)
or for the range of number of car users between (275:53; 362:69  336:24), Proposi-
tion 2 is satised which guarantees that for this user ow (number of car or road
users) Pareto-optimal and self-nancing parking pricing scheme exists.16 For ra-
tional function with   3:1, Nie and Liu (2010) concluded that Pareto-optimal
and self-nancing scheme does not exists when toll authority charges a lump-sum
congestion charge. However our numerical results show that such scheme exists for
 = 3:1 when parking charges are imposed per unit of time as a means to curb
congestion. For rational function with  = 0:8; the value of time of indi¤erent user
is found to be e = 12: 38 and accordingly Ne = 553:46 are the car users in absence
15Exact number for lower limit needs to nd by using some sophisticated software like Matlab.
16Exact number for lower limit needs to nd by using some sophisticated software like Matlab.
15
of parking charges, so individual with value of time   12: 38 will use cars. When
we examine table (3), we observe that for values of  in the range, where Tt < Tnt
is (11:56; 24:120) or for the range of number of car users between (267:81; 577:28),
Proposition 2 is satised but our relevant feasible range is for values of   12: 38.
Hence we can conclude that for values of  in the range (12: 38; 24:120) and accord-
ingly the number of car users between (267:81; 553:46) existence of Pareto-optimal
and self-nancing parking pricing scheme is guaranteed.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the existence of self-nancing and Pareto-optimal
parking pricing scheme by developing a simple static model. We consider an environ-
ment in which heterogenous travelers, in terms of the value of time, optimally choose
the trip duration and simultaneously choose between di¤erent modes of transporta-
tion such as car and public transit in order to maximize their respective utilities.
Public authorities charge parking fee per unit of time to curb congestion. While
taking into account the issue of equity, we derive condition(s) which may ensure the
pricing scheme to be both Pareto-optimal (no one is worse o¤ in terms of travel
time) and self-nancing in the sense that no external funds are required. Then,
we see what happens when the value of time distribution takes di¤erent functional
form.
We numerically check the existence of such pricing scheme when the value of
time distribution follows some specic rational functional forms. Nie and Liu (2010)
show that for some specic functional forms such scheme does not exist without
external subsidy but for the same functional form, we show that such scheme may
exist. In this paper, we assume that all travelers start their journey from the same
origin, relaxing this assumption and taking the spatial inequity issues into account
may reveal some interesting results into the analysis which are beyond the scope of
the current study. Equity issues cannot be solved completely if some travelers are
residing in an area where they are lacking in availability of public transit services. We
also assume here that transit services are not going to get crowded but incorporating
crowding cost similar to one in de Palma et al. (2015), into the objective function
of transit users may give some more insight to the present analysis. And we expect
relaxing the assumption of xed demand may challenge the results presented here.
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CHAPTER 2
Information acquisition and endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
under uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
In many countries, the presence of publicly owned rms while competing against
private rms can be observed in many industries like for example health, education,
telecommunication, insurance, banking, postal services and transport among oth-
ers. The literature recognizes this kind of market structure as the mixed oligopoly.
The research in mixed oligopoly gained momentum in the past decade, although
the literature on the subject is not new.17 Historically public rms have enjoyed a
monopoly in certain sectors in many countries but with the passage of time compe-
tition has increased with the participation in the form domestic private rms and
foreign-owned private rms. At the initial stages of market entry by private rms,
17Merrill and Schneider (1966) highlight the importance of ownership structure and conclude
that the presence of publicly owned rms in an oligopolistic market structure is useful in improving
the performance of the market in terms of lower prices and higher production levels. Anderson
et al. (1997) analyze the implication of privatization and they found that privatization of public
rm leads to higher prices in the short run thus harming the consumers. However, it will benet
consumers via increased varieties introduced by new entrants in the market because privatizing
public rm is like removing the barrier to the market entry. Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse (1989)
study how the presence of public rm while competi¬ng against private rms a¤ects the performance
of the oligopolistic market. They addressed the questions like whether total surplus increases more
when one of the existsing private rms is converted to public or it increases more when a new public
enterprise is created. They show that when the public rm pays a small premium to its workers
over the workers in private rms, converting one private rm to public rm in the oligopolistic
market improves total welfare in a second-best way. However, if there are already many public
rms in the industry, then privatizing all but one, can be best in terms of improving total welfare.
But when the public rm pays a large premium to its workers per unit of output, total surplus
increases by converting all private rms to the public rms. Further, they claim that changing
the status of existing private rms to a public rm is always superior to creating a new public
enterprise.
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public rms have owned a larger market share and thus enjoyed the rst mover
advantage (market leadership) and assuming exogenously the role of public rms
as Stackelberg leader was reasonable. But now since public rms face signicant
competitive pressure from private or foreign-owned private rms, the order of rms
moves is more of an endogenous in nature.18
The endogenous determination of simultaneous versus sequential moves in oligopolis-
tic market structure got popularity since the seminal work of Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990). The endogenous order of moves in mixed oligopoly was rst studied by
Pal (1998). In an environment, where uncertainty looms regarding market demand,
rms choices to become market leader or follower in making strategic decisions are
endogenous in nature. And further, rms motivation to acquire costly information
regarding market demand conditions largely depends upon whether a rm is enjoy-
ing a leadership position in a market or it is acting as a follower. For example, Raju
and Roy (2000) found that information has a great value under high uncertainty and
in more competitive industry. Moreover information is of great benet to the rm
acting as a market leader and competing in a Stackelberg fashion than competing
in a Bertrand way, however, they assume rms strategic position as market leader
to be exogenous.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on endogenous timing decisions
of rms in mixed duopoly by exploring the role of information advantage by a
rm (an early information of uncertain market demand) to endogenously become a
market leader in a quantity setting game.19 We consider a market of homogeneous
goods, where a publicly owned rm is competing against a purely private rm. The
public rm maximizes the social welfare (the sum of producer surplus and consumer
surplus) by optimally choosing its output which can be made in one of the two
periods early or late. While private rm faces the same problem of setting its optimal
quantity in one of the two periods early or late by maximizing its own prot. Firms
face a linear inverse demand function and produce with quadratic cost functions.
The market demand is stochastic and if rms make their output decisions in the rst
period without having any information about market demand, they, being risk-averse
maximize the expected value of their respective objective functions. Exact market
demand is revealed to both rms before the start of the second period thus rms
may have a perishable information advantage. We allow rms to have information
asymmetry about market demand. In order to see how a rm endogenously chooses
18Fjell and Heywood (2002) discuss the state of competition in the telecommunication industry
of Norway. Since January 1998 when the barriers to market entry were removed, the state-owned
Telenor faced signicant competition from the rms owned by di¤erent countries, for example,
United States, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland etc.
19In a two-stage model where rms choose capacities in the rst stage and prices in the second
stage, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) argue that these results coincide with the Cournot outcome.
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to become a leader in the market, we employ the framework of extended games with
observable delay developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In observable delay
games, rms rst decide on the timings of strategic decisions and commit to it.
If both of the rms opt to produce early in period one or both delay their output
decisions to the second period, they will compete in Cournot fashion. But if one rm
commits to produce early while other rm delays its output, the rst rm will act
as a Stackelberg leader and other will be the follower. In this case, the rm acting
as Stackelberg follower will observe the actual quantity produced by the leading
rm in period one and it will set its output accordingly. We also consider rms
to endogenously acquire costly information about the market demand by adding an
extra stage to the game as in Gilpatric and Li (2015) and derive the conditions under
which it is optimal for rms to acquire costly information about market demand.
Given that both rms have acquired information, we nd that two types of
Stackelberg equilibria with either rm acting as leader coexist. This case is same as
if there is no uncertainty regarding demand and we just added an additional term to
the demand intercept and thus we get same results as in Pal (1998). The case where
it is given that no rm has acquired information, two Stackelberg equilibria in pure
strategies with either rm acting as leader coexist under mild degree of variance of
demand. However, for higher uncertainty of demand reected by variance of demand
shock, rms endogenously decide to produce in the second period thus competing in
Cournot fashion. This case has been studied in Anam et al. (2007). Under the case
of asymmetric information where only public rm have acquired costly information
about market demand, both types of Stackelberg equilibria with either rm acting as
market leader exists only for small degree of demand uncertainty. However, for large
demand uncertainty represented by the variance of the stochastic intercept term,
only one Stackelberg equilibrium exists in which public rm, while being informed
about market demand, acts as a market leader. Under asymmetric information
situations, it is not a strictly dominant strategy for information advantaged rm to
move early as oppose to the case of private duopolies.20 A similar result emerges
when the private rm is assumed to have acquired costly information. For a smaller
degree of demand uncertainty, both Stackelberg equilibria with either rm acting as
a market leader co-exist. However under higher demand volatility as reected by the
variance of stochastic intercept, only one Stackelberg equilibrium with private rm
acting as leader exists. Unless both rms have not acquired information, rms in
mixed duopoly considered in this paper always move in a sequential way and dont
choose the same period to compete in a Cournot fashion.
20Gilpatric and Li (2015) conclude that in private duopoly, it a strictly dominant strategy
for information advantaged rm to move early, while for other information disadvantaged rm it
depends upon the uncertainty of market demand.
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The results of the information acquisition stage show that it is not optimal for
both rms to acquire costly information. So, there is no equilibrium where both rms
acquire information. This is in contrast to the private duopoly case, as Gilpatric
and Li (2015) show that in private duopoly, there is an equilibrium in which both
rms acquire information and play Cournot game in the early period. However,
under highly uncertain demand conditions, we nd that only one rm acquires the
costly information and becomes the leader of the market. So in the presence of high
uncertainty, early information of market demand helps the rm to endogenously
act as a market leader. Under low variance of the demand shock, no rm acquires
information and two types of sequential equilibria exist with either rm acting as
a leader with some parameter restrictions. An equilibrium outcome with certain
parametric restrictions under mild variance of demand shock also emerges where no
rm acquires information and then they choose quantities in the second period while
competing in Cournot fashion.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We briey review literature in
Section 2.2 and discuss model formulation in Section 2.3. In the Sections 2.4 and 2.5,
we derive sub-game perfect Nash equilibria of the timing game under no information
and full information (symmetric information) cases respectively. The results under
the cases of asymmetric information are discussed in Sections 2.6 and 2.7. We discuss
information acquisition stage in Section 2.8 and Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
There are two streams of literature which are relevant to the present context.
One stream of literature is related to the endogenous sequence of moves by rms
in oligopolistic markets. The second line of research is related to the incentives of
rms to acquire market information. In the private duopoly where rms are playing
a quantity setting game, the prot of a Stackelberg leader always exceeds than that
of Cournot prots when rms are facing linear demands and constant marginal costs
and Cournot prots are higher than that of a Stackelberg follower. Many studies
have taken the order of rms move in an exogenous way. The endogenous determi-
nation of simultaneous versus sequential moves by rms in oligopoly got popularity
since the seminal work of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).21 Amir and Grilo (1999)
21Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) propose two ways to endogenize the timing of moves by rms in
an oligopoly model; extended games with action commitment and extended games with observable
delays. In the observable delay games, rms pre-commit to the periods in which to produce in
pre-stage and then they play the actual game in one of the two periods by optimally choosing the
quantities in the periods committed earlier
23
derive the conditions on demand and cost functions and nd that log-concavity of
inverse demand function is su¢ cient to derive rms to play endogenously Cournot
in timing game. This holds irrespective of the shape of the cost function. On the
other hand, if inverse demand function is log-convex in nature, then rms reaction
functions are increasing and they behave in a Stackelberg fashion taking the role of
both leader and follower endogenously. However, it requires rms to produce their
goods free of cost. Dowrick (1986) nds that the slope of the reaction functions of
the prot-maximizing rms plays the key role in agreeing over the assigned roles as a
leader or follower in the Stackelberg model. He shows that when reaction functions
are negatively sloped both of the rms prefers to take the role of Stackelberg leader.
If the rmsreaction functions are positively sloped, then if the role of leadership is
preferred by one rm then the other rm prefers to be a follower unless they face
similar cost and demand structures in that case both of the rms prefer being a
follower to acting as a leader.
Spencer and Brander (1992) study the endogenous moves (early commitment
versus exible delay) in a private duopoly where rms face uncertain market demand.
They show that in equilibrium, rms compete in a Cournot game in period one (early
commitment) under low uncertainty and they compete again in a Cournot fashion
in period two when demand uncertainty is quite high. In a setting, where one rm
has exogenously given the choice to become Stackelberg leader, they nd that it
prefers to retain the status of leadership just under low uncertainty while under
high uncertainty, it prefers to compete in a Cournot fashion when uncertainty is
resolved.22 However, they show that the rm having a better information of market
demand shock acts as a Stackelberg leader. In a pure duopoly, Liu (2005) compares
the strategic advantage of being a Stackelberg leader (early commitment) versus
the benets of being fully informed while acting as Stackelberg follower (retaining
exibility). In his model rms face an uncertain demand and their roles as leader
and follower are assigned exogenously. The leader makes his output choice on the
expected value of demand (not knowing the actual value) but follower makes his
output choice having the true value of market demand. He shows that the benet
of remaining exible outweighs the strategic advantage of moving early if the true
value of demand is quite high or quite low from its expected value.23 In this case,
Stackelberg follower earns a higher payo¤ than Stackelberg leader. For a large range
of parameters in his model, Stackelberg leadership strategy is preferred by the rm
over playing Cournot.
In a signaling game, Mailath (1993) analyzes the implication of asymmetric in-
22In their model, if the rm prefers to become Stackelberg leader and moves early then it is
perfectly informed about the timing of the move of its opponent.
23A very low realized value of demand may lead to negative prot for the Stackelberg leader.
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formation regarding quantity decisions of duopolist rms. He considers an environ-
ment where market demand is uncertain and potentially can take three values high,
medium and low. One of the rms is exogenously informed about market demand
and have the option of moving early than the uninformed rm or it can delay its
output and can set simultaneous with the uninformed rm. He shows that in a
stable equilibrium the informed rm chooses to move early and become Stackelberg
leader irrespective of its private information. Although informed rm could get an
ex-ante higher payo¤ while choosing its quantity along with uninformed rm simul-
taneously but because of the stability requirements, only Stackelberg equilibrium
emerges where the informed rm acts as a market leader.
In a similar framework, Normann (1997) nds that another Stackelberg equi-
librium exists in which uninformed rm acts as a leader, while all informed rms
follow when uninformed rms have the opportunity to move. In the framework of
extended games with observable delay, where rms rst decide on the periods in
which they will take actions and they are committed to it, Normann (2002) studies
the endogenous timing decisions of the rms in a model formulation similar to the
one in Mailath (1993).24 The results show that in addition to the Stackelberg out-
comes with either rm acting as a market leader, the Cournot outcome also emerges
which is supported by a wide range of parameters. In all of these papers, rms are
exogenously allowed to have information asymmetry.
In a pure duopoly, van Damme and Hurkens (1999) study the endogenous timing
decisions of rms while playing extended games with action commitment as intro-
duced by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Firms face linear demand and produce with
constant marginal costs, however one rm has lower marginal cost thus being more
e¢ cient than the other rm. They show that each of the Stackelberg outcomes is an
equilibrium of this game. But when the criterion of risk dominance of Harsanyi and
Selton (1988) is applied they show that there is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium
in which low-cost rm acts as a leader because it is most costly for the high-cost
rm to commit early. Shi (2015) develop a pure duopoly model where rms face an
uncertain demand and have options to produce in period one or costlessly wait and
produce in period two without having information about market demand. Firms
also have an option to do costly market research to know about market demand.
Shi (2015) nd that if market research is too costly or too cheap, then rms play
in the same period and Cournot outcome emerges in this game. However, for inter-
mediate cost range, market leadership arises endogenously. To see more research on
the role of information and incentives for rms to share information see for example
24Normann (1997) builds on the framework of extended games with action commitment intro-
duced by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
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Raju and Roy (2000) and Yan et al. (2012).25
Daughety and Reinganum (1994) analyze the endogenous sequencing decisions of
the rms in a signaling game, where the slope of the market demand for homogenous
goods can take possibly two values. They allow ex-ante symmetric rms to acquire
information and then decide to set their quantities in one of two periods. The
results show that asymmetry arises in the equilibrium in the sense that only one
rm acquires information and the informed rm acts as a Stackelberg leader. Both
rms dont acquire information in the equilibrium unless it is free. Since the true
market demand is never revealed to the follower, rms play a signaling game. In
a pure duopoly model with horizontally di¤erentiated goods, where rms face cost
uncertainty, Albaek (1990) nds that a Natural Stackelberg Situation emerges in
quantity competition.26 And rm with higher cost variance acts as a Stackelberg
leader in the equilibrium.
The literature on mixed oligopoly has proliferated recently within the last decade.
The issue of simultaneous versus sequential moves regarding quantity setting in
mixed oligopoly was rst studied by Pal (1998). He shows that two sub-game perfect
Nash equilibria endogenously emerge and can coexist; the one in which public rm
acts as a leader and the other in which private rm acts as a leader. When there
are more than two periods in which rms can produce, Pal (1998) shows that all
private rms choose to produce in period one while public rm produces afterward.27
However, social welfare is higher when public rm acts as a follower rather than
when it acts as a leader. He considers constant marginal costs of production and
assumes that public rm produces at a higher cost thus being less e¢ cient. However,
Matsumura (2003a) nds a Stackelberg outcome where the public rm acts as a
leader when competing against a foreign-owned private rm. And this outcome is
25Raju and Roy (2000) studied the value of information and they found that it is of great value
under high demand uncertainty and in more competitive industry represented by high product
substitutability. Moreover, in private duopoly, information benets more to the rm acting as a
market leader and competing in a Stackelberg fashion than competing in a Bertrand way. However,
they assume rms strategic position as market leader to be exogenous. In a game theoretic model,
Yan et al. (2012) study the incentives of an upstream manufacturer to share information with
downstream retailers di¤ering in their market shares or positions. They nd that it is optimal for
the manufacturer to share information with one small and less dominant retailer.
26In his model, both rms know the distribution of costs but they do not know the actual values
of their own as well as their opponents costs. A Natural Stackelberg Situation is dened as the
situation, where both rms agree on assigning the role of leadership to one rm and the role of
following to the other rm and further, both rms prefer this situation over Nash.
27Jacques (2004) claims that this result is sensitive to the number of private rms. specically,
he shows that this result holds only when the number of private rms ¬s greater than or equal
to two. When there is singly private rms competing against the public rm, there is another
equilibrium in which public rm chooses period one and private rm follows. Lu (2007) highlights
the another sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in which all private rm make their quantity choices
in any period except the last one while public rm acts as a follower.
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socially e¢ cient as opposed to the Pal (1998).
By allowing two periods of production, Matsumura (2003b) investigates the en-
dogenous order of moves of rms in a mixed duopoly. He nds that multiple equi-
libria exist including Cournot type and Stackelberg type equilibrium with private
rm acting as a leader. However, he shows that no Stackelberg type equilibrium
with public rm acting as a leader exists. By adding small inventory cost into the
model, he claims that unique Stackelberg type equilibrium with public rm acting
as a follower exists. In these papers market demand functions are deterministic thus
rms face no uncertainties regarding demand. Anam et al. (2007) investigated the
endogenous timing decisions of the rms in mixed duopoly when rms face uncer-
tainty regarding market demand. By using the framework developed by Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990), they nd that multiple equilibria in the quantity-setting game
exist in a mixed duopoly. Specically, they show that along with two Stackelberg
outcomes with either public and private rm acting as a leader, Cournot outcome
also appears, where both rms produce in period two when uncertainty is resolved.
However social welfare is higher when the private rm takes the role of leader and
public rm follows thus conrming the result in Pal (1998). Moreover, when the
public rm is competing against a foreign private rm, they show that under mod-
erate uncertainty, public rm act as a leader and this outcome is socially e¢ cient
as well in line with Matsumura (2003a). However in their model, there is no role of
information acquisition, rms are homogeneous in terms of the level of information
about market demand.
Our study is related to Gilpatric and Li (2015) who develop a model, where
two prot-maximizing rms facing uncertain market demand, decide on whether to
produce in period one or two. They show that under asymmetric information, it
is a strictly dominant strategy for an information advantaged rm to produce in
period one. In their model, if a rm chooses to produce in period two, it becomes
fully informed about market demand before the start of the period two. However,
the timing decision of less informed or information disadvantaged rm hinges on the
variance of demand shock since it faces a trade-o¤ between the strategic advantage
of moving early versus the value of being fully informed about market demand while
producing in period two. They show that under high variance of the demand shock,
the less informed rm chooses to capitalize on being fully informed and acts as a
follower. Hence information asymmetry endogenously leads to a Stackelberg market
structure. However, under the low variance, a standard Cournot outcome appears
and both rms produce in period one. In the information acquisition stage which
appears before the timing decision stage, they nd that when the variance of demand
shock is high, both rms acquire information and play Cournot in period one in the
subsequent game. Neither of the rms acquires information when the variance is
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low and for intermediate ranges of the variance of the demand shock, only one rm
acquires costly information. However, they show that endogenous leadership only
arises when there is a signicant di¤erence between the xed costs of acquiring
information between the rms. We apply their model set up to the mixed duopoly
market structure.28
In the context of mixed duopoly, Tomaru and Kiyono (2010) investigate the en-
dogenous timing decisions of the rms, facing increasing marginal costs in a quantity
setting game. They show that two types of sequential equilibrium coexist with ei-
ther rm acting as Stackelberg leader thus their results conform to the ndings of
Pal (1998) even when rms face increasing marginal costs.29 While Lu and Poddar
(2009) nd that simultaneous move cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in mixed duopoly when rms are endogenously deciding on capacity
then quantity. Their results are also in line with the ndings on endogenous timing
in mixed duopoly cited earlier that multiple equilibria can exist where either type
of rm acts as a leader. Naya (2015) studies the endogenous timing decisions of
a partially privatized rm in a quantity setting while competing against a private
domestic rm in a di¤erentiated goods market. The results reveal that under a
lower degree of privatization, both types of sequential equilibria exist with either
rm acting as Stackelberg leader. Under medium level of privatization, only one
equilibrium exists with private rm acting as a leader while under the higher level
of privatization rms compete in Cournot fashion endogenously.
However, more recently, Matsumura and Ogawa (2017a) overturned this stan-
dard result of endogenous timing game in mixed duopoly as in Pal (1998) and
Matsumura (2003a) among others. While investigating the endogenous timing de-
cisions of rms in a mixed duopoly, they nd that in the presence of a signicant
negative production externality, rms endogenously choose to compete in Cournot
fashion. Under negative externality, they show that rms make sequential moves
when competing in prices, again in contrast to the standard ndings in the literature
on mixed duopolies. So they conclude that in the presence of a signicant negative
externality, mixed duopolies behave in the same way as private duopolies in the
28It is well-known result in the mixed oligopoly that the public rm will monopolize over all
the production if the public rm is equally e¢ cient as the private rm and produces with constant
marginal cost (see for example Bárcena-Ruiz (2012)). In order to avoid this problem, we assume
that both rms produce by using quadratic cost functions while Gilpatric and Li (2015) allow rms
to produce with the constant marginal costs since they deal with only prot-maximizing rms. Pal
(1998) deals with this problem by assuming that public rm produces with a positive constant
marginal cost while the private rm has zero marginal cost. In Anam et al. (2007) both rms
produce with quadratic costs.
29In their model, inverse demand function is deterministic and more general rather than linear
and rms face similar convex cost functions. While in Pal (1998) and Matsumura (2003a) rms
face linear inverse demand functions and have constant marginal cost.
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endogenous timing game. While introducing product di¤erentiation into the model
as in Dixit (1979), Matsumura and Ogawa(2017b) study the endogenous timing de-
cisions of rms in a mixed duopoly in quantity-setting game. They found that two
Stackelberg equilibria with either rm acting as leader exist. However, from the so-
cial welfare perspective, it is desirable when public rm acts as a follower. They also
show that the equilibrium with public rm acting as the leader is risk-dominant and
robust under the high degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation. While competing
with foreign-owned private rm, they show that two sequential move equilibria; pub-
lic leadership and foreign-owned private rm leadership exists. But social welfare is
higher under the leadership of public rm and it is risk-dominant and thus a robust
equilibrium.30
In a homogenous goods market, Ogawa and Kazuhiko (2006) study the price
setting behavior of rms in a mixed duopoly. Firms are exogenously assigned the
roles of leader and follower and they also allow rms to set prices simultaneously.
They show that private rm while taking the role of leadership, sets higher price
than the price set under the leadership of public rm and under some parametric
restrictions this price is also higher than the Nash price set simultaneously. Public
rms while taking care of the consumer surplus as well as the prot of private rms
sets the same price as set by the private rm irrespective of the role it enjoys.
Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) considers the mixed duopoly and di¤erentiated goods market
to analyze the endogenous moves of rms in the pricing game. He shows that rms
in mixed duopoly set their prices simultaneously as opposed to the private duopoly
where rms set their prices sequentially. However in quantity-setting game rms
move sequentially in the mixed duopoly.
In another paper, Gilpatric and Li (2016) while considering the endogenous role
of rms as a leader or follower in a di¤erentiated Bertrand duopoly facing uncertain
demand, nd that there is always an equilibrium, in which information advantaged
rm acts as a leader. Since in their model both rms know the actual market
demand in the second period, the less informed rm capitalizes on this and behaves
as a follower to perfectly known with market demand. They show that there is
no equilibrium where both rms choose to buy the information before deciding on
timings to move.
30In a di¤erent context, Zhang and Li (2013) analyze the timing of location decisions of a
public and a private rm in a Hotelling-type model, with rms facing the uncertainty regarding
the locations of the consumer. They show that when the degree of uncertainty is too high, both
rm delay their entrance to the market while they nd that there is no equilibrium accompanied
with the small degree of uncertainty.
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2.3 Model
We consider a mixed duopoly model, where rm 1 is publicly owned, while rm
2 is a pure domestic private rm. Both rms are making strategic decisions on
quantities while facing an uncertain demand. Firms are selling homogenous goods
and face a linear inverse demand function of the following form:
p = A+    qi   qj (23)
which has a stochastic intercept term  . We assume  is a random variable having a
continuous c.d.f   F (:) with E [ ] = 0 and var [ ] = 2 > 0: Following Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990), rms play an extended game with observable delay where rms
have to decide on the timing of the their actions (commitment stage) as well as
on the actual actions (action stage). In the extended games, rms pre-commit to
the periods in which to produce in pre-stage and then they play the actual game
in two periods and optimally produce the quantities in the periods committed. If
both rms have committed to produce earlier, they play a standard Cournot game
in period one but if they both have committed to delay their output, they play
Cournot game in period two. But if one rm has committed to play earlier, while
other commits to late, then they compete in a Stackelberg fashion in output game.
We allow rms to have information asymmetry in the sense that if a rm has acquired
costly information then it knows the exact realization of the demand shock before
the start of period 1 and thus it is informed. While, to the uninformed rm, demand
uncertainty is resolved before the start of the period 2. So the informed rm has
a perishable informational advantage over the other rm because true demand is
also revealed to the other rm before the start of the second period. Following
Gilpatric and Li (2015), we assume that rms acquire information about market
demand through a costly market research at a xed cost F > 0 and it also increases
the marginal cost of the rm by k > 0. Both rms produce by using a convex cost
function of the following form:
Ci (qi) = Iikqi +
q2i
2
; (24)
where
Ii =
8<:1; if rm i acquires information0; otherwise (25)
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The prot function of rm i will be as follows:
i =

A+    qi   q0j

qi   Ci (qi) ; (26)
where,
q
0
j =
8<:qj (qi) ; if rm j moves after rm iqj; otherwise (27)
The objective of the rm 1, being a public rm, is to maximize social welfare
which is the sum of prots of both rms and consumer surplus.
SW = 1 +2 + CS (28)
Following the literature, we use the expected value of consumer surplus as a mea-
sure of consumer welfare irrespective of whether the rm is informed about market
demand or otherwise.31 Specically, consumer surplus is written as:
E [CS] = E

A(q1 + q2)  (q1 + q2)
2
2
  p1q1   p2q2

(29)
using inverse demand function and after simplication, the expected value of con-
sumer surplus reduces to:
E [CS] = (q1 + q2)
2=2 (30)
The gure 1 below presents the sequence of events which is as follows. In the
rst stage, rms simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide on to acquire costly
information about market demand and at the end of this stage their choices become
common knowledge. In order to endogenize the timing decisions of the rms, we
follow the framework of observable delay games of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
In the second stage, rms simultaneously make choices about the timing of their
production decisions and strictly commit to it. At the end of this stage, choices of
rms regarding timings become common knowledge. After that, rms make their
production decisions according to timing choices made earlier. If both rms have
opted to produce early in period one, then production takes place only in the period
one of production stage. But if rms have opted to produce in di¤erent periods, the
rm who opted to produce early becomes the leader and produces in the period one
31Anam et al. (2007) use expected consumer surplus as a measure of consumer welfare. If
consumers are risk-neutral and face a demand whose income elasticity is zero, then Stennek (1999)
claim that expected consumer surplus is an appropriate measure for the welfare of consumers in
uncertain environments. However, these conditions do not hold empirically all the time. Schlee
(2008) also supports this idea that expected consumer surplus is a fairly good measure of consumer
welfare under uncertainties.
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of production stage as shown in gure 1. While the follower produces in the period
two of the production stage. After that consumers make their purchases.
Figure 1: Sequence of events
In the section 2.4, we exogenously assume that both of the rms have not acquired
information (thus both uninformed), while in section 2.5, we exogenously assume
that both of the rms have acquired information (thus both informed) and analyze
their timing decisions. While in the sections 2.6 and 2.7, we exogenously hold that
only the public rm and only the private rm have acquired costly information
respectively and we study the endogenous timing choices of the rms. We solve the
model by using backward induction.
2.4 No rm has acquired information
In this section, we assume that both rms have not acquired costly information
however, they will learn about the realization of market demand shock before the
start of period two. In this case, both rms will optimally choose their respective
quantities by maximizing the expected values of the following pay o¤ functions, if
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they both decided to produce in period one.
E (SW ) =
Z
(A+    q1   q2) (q1 + q2) dF ( )  C1 (q1)  C2 (q2) + E (CS) ;
(31)
E (2) =
Z
(A+    q1   q2) q2dF ( )  C2 (q2) : (32)
Since both rms have not acquired information, Ii = 0 holds for both rms and
so there are no k terms in the above functions. If both the rms commit to produce
early in period one (Early, Early), they will play compete in a standard Cournot
fashion. Taking FOCs of the above payo¤ functions and simultaneously solving
them, we get following optimal Nash quantities and accordingly their respective
ex-ante expected payo¤s:
q1 =
2
5
A; q2 =
1
5
A; (33)
E (SW ) =
8
25
A2; E (2) =
3
50
A2: (34)
Now suppose that both rms have committed to compete in Cournot fashion in
period two (Late, Late), they will learn the actual value of market demand shock
(for example as  0) before the start of period two. Given  0, rms will maximize the
actual payo¤ functions (not in expected terms). Taking FOCs and simultaneously
solving them, we get the following optimal quantities and payo¤s in expected terms:
q1 =
2
5
(A+  0); q

2 =
1
5
(A+  0); (35)
E (SW ) =
8
25
A2 +
8
25
2; (36)
E (2) =
3
50
A2 +
3
50
2: (37)
Now suppose the public rm has committed to produce early in period one, while
private rm commits to produce late in period two, they compete in a Stackelberg
fashion in which public rm acts as a leader while private rm acts as a follower
(Early, Late). Solving from backward induction, we get following optimal quantities
under public rm leadership:
ql1 =
5
14
A; qf2 =
9
42
A+
1
3
 0: (38)
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In this case, their corresponding ex-ante expected payo¤s are:
E (SW ) =
9
28
A2 +
2
9
2; (39)
E (2) =
81
1176
A2 +
196
1176
2: (40)
If the private rm has opted to produce early in period one and public rm
commits to produce in period two, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion with
private rm acting as a leader, while public rm behaves as a follower (Late, Early).
Their optimal quantities and payo¤s in expected terms are:
qf1 =
1
16
(5A+ 4 0); q
l
2 =
1
4
A; (41)
E (SW ) =
21
64
A2 +
16
64
2; (42)
E (2) =
1
16
A2: (43)
The table below summarizes the ex-ante expected payo¤ to the players. Based
on these payo¤s and by straightforward calculations, we nd Nash equilibria of
endogenous timing game in pure strategies and results are recorded in the following
proposition.
Firm 2
Early Late
Firm 1 Early 8
25
A2; 3
50
A2 9
28
A2 + 2
9
2; 81
1176
A2 + 196
1176
2
Late 21
64
A2 + 16
64
2; 1
16
A2 8
25
A2 + 8
25
2; 3
50
A2 + 3
50
2
Table 4: Payo¤ matrix when both rms are uninformed
Proposition 3 (both rms are uninformed) Given that both of the rms have
not acquired information and they will learn the realization of market demand before
the start of period 2, then: i) there is no equilibrium in which rms produce in
the period 1. ii) there is a pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium with public rm
leadership i¤ 0  2  9A2=616. ii¬) there is a pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium
with private rm acting as a leader i¤ 0  2  A2=24. iv) there is a pure strategy
equilibrium with both rms producing in period 2 i¤ 2 > A2=24:
Proof. For proof see Proposition 1 in Anam et al. (2007).
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2.5 Both rms have acquired information
In this section, we assume that both public as well as the private rm have
acquired information ( Ii = 1 8i = 1; 2) and are thus informed about market demand
realizations before the start of period 1. By knowing exactly, the realization of
random intercept of demand as  0, the objective functions of both rms are:
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SW = (A+  0   q1   q2) (q1 + q2)  C1 (q1)  C2 (q2) + E (CS) ; (44)
2 = (A+  0   q1   q2) q2   C2 (q2) : (45)
Given that both of the rms have acquired information and opted to produce either
in period 1 (Early, Early) or in period 2 (Late, Late), they will play a standard
Cournot game. FOCs give the following reaction functions which are negatively
sloped reecting that quantities are strategic substitutes:
q1 (q2) =
1
2
(A  k +  0) 
1
2
q; (46)
q2 (q1) =
1
3
(A  k +  0) 
1
3
q1; (47)
Simultaneously solving the above reaction functions, we get the following optimal
quantities:
q1 =
2
5
(A  k +  0); q2 =
1
5
(A  k +  0); (48)
Their corresponding prots in expected terms are as follows:
E (SW ) =
8
25
(A  k)2 + 8
25
2; (49)
E (2) =
3
50
(A  k)2 + 3
50
2: (50)
If the public rm has committed to produce early in period 1, while private rm
commits to produce late in period 2, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion in which
public rm acts as a leader while private rm acts as a follower. Using backward
induction, we solve rst solve the followers problem which gives the reaction function
of the private rm as given by equation (47). Public rm by taking into account the
reaction function of rm 2, maximizes its objective function as specied in equation
(44). Optimal quantities of the leader and follower are:
ql1 =
5
14
(A  k +  0); qf2 =
3
14
(A  k +  0); (51)
32Since the xed cost of acquiring information F is a sunk cost, so it is excluded from optimiza-
tion.
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Their respective ex-ante expected payo¤s are as follows:
E (SW ) =
9
28
(A  k)2 + 9
28
2; (52)
E (2) =
27
392
(A  k)2 + 27
392
2: (53)
If private rm commits to produce early in period 1 and public rm produces
in period 2, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion in which private rm acts as a
leader while public rm becomes the follower. Again by using backward induction,
we nd the following optimal quantities :
qf1 =
3
8
(A  k +  0); ql2 =
1
4
(A  k +  0); (54)
In private rm leadership case, their corresponding payo¤s in expected terms are:
E (SW ) =
21
64
(A  k)2 + 21
64
2; (55)
E (2) =
1
16
(A  k)2 + 1
16
2: (56)
The table below summarizes the payo¤ to the players in expected terms.
Firm 2
Early Late
Firm 1 Early 8(A k)
2
25
+ 8
2
25
; 3(A k)
2
50
+ 3
2
50
9(A k)2
28
+ 9
2
28
; 27(A k)
2
392
+ 27
2
392
Late 21(A k)
2
64
+ 21
2
64
; (A k)
2
16
+ 
2
16
8(A k)2
25
+ 8
2
25
; 3(A k)
2
50
+ 3
2
50
Table 5: Payo¤ matrix when both rm are informed
The following proposition presents the main result of this section regarding Nash
equilibria of endogenous timing game in pure strategies.
Proposition 4 (both rms have acquired information) Given that both rms
have acquired information and are informed about demand realization in period 1,
then: i) there is no equilibrium in which rms produce in the same period in the
extended game. ii) there are two sequential move equilibria with either public or
private rm acting as a leader.
Proof. i) (Early, Early) is not an equilibrium because in this case public rm can
get higher payo¤by deviating to late and its incremental payo¤is SW (Late; Early) 
SW (Early; Early) = 13((A k)2+2)=1600 > 0. Private rm also benets by de-
viating to late and its incremental payo¤ is 2(Early; Late)   2(Early; Early)
= 87((A   k)2 + 2)=9800 > 0. Similarly (Late, Late) is not an equilibrium
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because both rms have incentives to deviate. Incremental payo¤ to rm 1 is
SW (Early; Late)   SW (Late; Late) = ((A   k)2 + 2)=700 > 0 and incremen-
tal payo¤ to rm 2 while deviating to early is 2(Late; Early)  2(Late; Late) =
((A  k)2 + 2)=400 > 0.
ii) Straightforward calculations reveal that (Early, Late) is indeed an equilib-
rium since no rm has the incentive to deviate. Deviation payo¤ to rm 1 is
SW (Late; Late)  SW (Early; Late) =  ((A   k)2 + 2)=700 < 0 and devia-
tion payo¤ to rm 2 is 2(Early; Early)   2(Early; Late) =  87((A   k)2 +
2)=9800 < 0. Playing (Late,Early) is another equilibrium since deviation does
not benet either of the rm. Deviation payo¤ to rm 1 is SW (Early; Early) 
SW (Late; Early) =  13((A  k)2+ 2)=1600 < 0 and deviation payo¤ to rm 2 is
2(Late; Late)  2(Late; Early) =  ((A  k)2 + 2)=400 < 0.
2.6 Only public rm has acquired information
In this section, we assume that only public rm has acquired information (I1 = 1)
and thus it knows the specic value of market demand shock as  0 before the start
of period one. While, the private rm having information disadvantage (I2 = 0)
over the public rm, will learn the market demand realization before the start of
period two. It will maximize the expected prot if it chooses to produce in period
one. Objective functions of the rms will look like:
SW = (A+  0   q1   q2) (q1 + q2) + E (CS)  C1 (q1)  C2 (q2) ; (57)
E (2) =
Z
(A+    q1   q2) q2dF ( )  C2 (q2) : (58)
Suppose both rms have committed to produce early in period one, they will
compete in a Cournot fashion (Early, Early). Given that only public rm has ac-
quired information, their optimal quantities and payo¤s in expected terms are as
follows:
q1 =
1
10
(4A  6k + 5 0) ; q2 =
1
5
(A+ k) ; (59)
E (SW ) =
1
100
 
32A2   36Ak + 32k2+ 1
4
2; (60)
E (2) =
3
50
(A+ k)2: (61)
Now suppose that both rms commit to play Cournot game in period two (Late,
Late), then at the start of period two, the private rm will also learn the realized
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value of market demand shock. Cournot quantities and rms corresponding payo¤s
in expected terms are as follows:
q1 =
1
5
(2A  3k + 2 0) ; q2 =
1
5
(A+ k +  0) ; (62)
E (SW ) =
1
25
 
8A2   9Ak + 8k2+ 8
25
2; (63)
E (2) =
3
50
(A+ k)2 +
3
50
2: (64)
If the public rm has opted to produce early in period one, while private rm
chooses to produce late in period two, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion in
which public rm acts as a leader while private rm follows. Optimal quantities and
corresponding ex-ante expected payo¤s under public rm leadership are:
ql1 =
1
14
(5A  9k + 5 0) ; qf2 =
3
14
(A+ k +  0) (65)
E (SW ) =
1
28
 
9A2   10Ak + 9k2+ 9
28
2 (66)
E (2) =
27
392
(A+ k)2 +
27
392
2 (67)
Now suppose that private rm has committed to produce early in period one and
public rm produces late in period two, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion in
which private rm acts as a leader while public rm becomes a follower. Here, the
private rm will maximize its expected prot by taking into account the reaction
function of the public rm. In this case of private rm leadership, their optimal
quantities and expected payo¤s are:
qf1 =
1
8
(3A  5k + 4 0) ; ql2 =
1
4
(A+ k) ; (68)
E (SW ) =
1
64
 
21A2   22Ak + 21k2+ 1
4
2; (69)
E (2) =
1
16
(A+ k)2: (70)
The ex-ante expected payo¤s to the players found in this section are recorded
in the table below. Then, we nd pure strategy Nash equilibria of the endogenous
timing game and summarize the discussion of this section in the proposition below.
Proposition 5 (only the public rm has acquired information) Following that
only public rm has acquired information and is thus informed about demand realiza-
tion in period 1, then: i) there is no equilibrium in which rms produce in the same
period. ii) there is a pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium with public rm acting as
a leader i¤ 2  0. ii¬) there is another pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium with
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Firm 2
Early Late
Firm 1 Early 32A
2 36Ak+32k2
100
+ 
2
4
; 3(A+k)
2
50
9A2 10Ak+9k2
28
+ 9
2
28
; 27(A+k)
2
392
+ 27
2
392
Late 21A
2 22Ak+21k2
64
+ 
2
4
; (A+k)
2
16
8A2 9Ak+8k2
25
+ 8
2
25
; 3(A+k)
2
50
+ 3
2
50
Table 6: Payo¤ matrix when only the public rm is informed
private rm acting as a leader i¤ 0  2  (A2 + 2Ak + k2) =24.
Proof. i) It is clear that (Early, Early) is not an equilibrium because both rms
have incentives to deviate and can get higher payo¤s. For example public rm can get
a higher payo¤by deviating to late and its incremental payo¤is SW  (Late; Early) 
SW  (Early; Early) = 13 ((A+ k)2 + 2) =1600 > 0. And private rm also benets
by deviating to late and its incremental payo¤is2 (Early; Late) 2 (Early; Early)
= 3 (29(A+ k)2 + 2252) =9800 > 0. Similarly (Late, Late) is not an equilibrium be-
cause both rms have incentives to deviate.Incremental payo¤ to rm 1, in this case,
is SW  (Early; Late) SW  (Late; Late) = ((A+ k)2 + 2) =700 > 0 and incremen-
tal payo¤ to rm 2 while deviating to early is 2 (Late; Early) 2 (Late; Late) =
((A+ k)2   242) =400 which is > 0 as long as 2 < (A + k)2=24. Since the public
rm has a clear incentive to deviate so, (Late, Late) is not an equilibrium irrespective
of the level of 2.
ii) (Early, Late) is an equilibrium since no rm has the incentive to deviate.
Deviation payo¤ to rm 1 is SW (Late; Late)  SW (Early; Late) =  ((A+ k)2+
2)=700 < 0 and deviation payo¤ to rm 2 is 2(Early; Early) 2(Early; Late) =
 (29(A+ k)2 + 2252)=9800 < 0. For (Late,Early) to be an equilibrium we require
that both rms have no incentive to deviate unilaterally. Deviation does not benet
to the public rm because its deviation payo¤ is negative SW (Early; Early) 
SW (Late; Early) =  13(A   k)2=1600 < 0 and deviation payo¤ to rm 2 is
2 (Late; Late)   2 (Late; Early) = (242   (A + k)2)=400 which is negative or
equal to zero whenever 0  2  (A+ k)2=24.
2.7 Only private rm has acquired information
In this section, we exogenously allow the only private rm to acquire costly
information (I2 = 1) and it knows exact realization of market demand shock (for
example as  0). While public rm having information disadvantage (I1 = 0), will
learn the realized value of demand shock at the start of period two if it opts to defer
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its production to period two. Their objective functions, in this case, can be written
as:
E (SW ) =
Z
(A+    q1   q2) (q1 + q2) dF ( ) + E (CS)  C1 (q1)  C2 (q2) ;
(71)
2 = (A+  0   q1   q2) q2   C2 (q2) : (72)
Suppose both rms opted to produce early in period one and play Cournot
game, the public rm will maximize its payo¤ in expected terms and the private
rm will maximize its payo¤ given the realized value of market demand shock as  0.
Followings are the optimal quantities and corresponding payo¤s in expected terms
if they both have opted to produce early in period one:
q1 =
1
5
(2A+ k) ; q2 =
1
15
(3A  6k + 5 0) ; (73)
E (SW ) =
8A2   7Ak + 7k2
25
+
22
9
; (74)
E (2) =
(3A  6k)2
150
+
252
150
: (75)
Now suppose both rms simultaneous produce in period two and play Cournot
game, the public rm will also learn the realized value of demand shock before
the start of period two. Optimization of the payo¤ functions given  0; yields the
following optimal quantities and corresponding ex-ante expected payo¤s:
q1 =
1
5
(2A+ k + 2 0) ; q

2 =
1
5
(A  2k +  0) ; (76)
E (SW ) =
8A2   7Ak + 7k2
25
+
82
25
; (77)
E (2) =
3(A  2k)2
50
+
32
50
: (78)
If the public rm has committed to produce early in period one and private rm
opts to produce in period two, the public rm acts as a Stackelberg leader, while rm
acts as Stackelberg follower. The public rm maximizes the expected value of social
surplus while taking into account the optimal response function of the private rm.
Solving the problem from backward induction, we nd following optimal quantities
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and expected payo¤s under public rm leadership:
ql1 =
1
14
(5A+ 4k) ; qf2 =
3
14
(A  2k) + 1
3
 0; (79)
E (SW ) =
81A2   72Ak + 72k2
252
+
562
252
; (80)
E (2) =
(9A  18k)2
1176
+
1962
1176
: (81)
The case, where private rm opts to produce early in period one while acting as
a Stackelberg leader and public rm acting as a Stackelberg follower will learn the
realized value of market demand shock before the start of period two. Solving in the
same way as above, we get optimal quantities and expected payo¤s under private
rm leadership as:
qf1 =
1
8
(3A+ 2k + 3 0); q
l
2 =
1
4
(A  2k +  0); (82)
E (SW ) =
1
25
 
21A2   20Ak + 20k2+ 2
9
2; (83)
E (2) =
1
16
(A  2k)2 + 1
16
2: (84)
The following table summarizes the above discussion and presents the expected
payo¤ to the players. Nash equilibria in this case of information asymmetry are
recorded in the following proposition.
Firm 2
Early Late
Firm 1 Early 8A
2 7Ak+7k2
25
+ 2
2
9
; 81A
2 72Ak+72k2
252
+ 56
2
252
;
(3A 6k)2
150
+ 25
2
150
(9A 18k)2
1176
+ 196
2
1176
Late 21A
2 20Ak+20k2
64
+ 21
2
64
; 8A
2 7Ak+7k2
25
+ 8
2
25
;
(A 2k)2
16
+ 
2
16
3(A 2k)2
50
+ 3
2
50
Table 7: Payo¤ matrix when only private rm is informed
Proposition 6 (only the private rm has acquired information) Given that
only private rm has acquired information and is thus informed about demand re-
alization in period one, then: i) there is no equilibrium in which rms produce
in the same period. ii) there is a pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium with pub-
lic rm acting as a leader i¤ 2  9(A2   4Ak + 4k2)=616. ii¬) there is another
pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium where the private rm acts as leader i¤ 2 
 A2 + 4Ak   4k2:
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Proof. i) (Early, Early) is not an equilibrium because the public rm can get a
higher payo¤ by deviating to late and its incremental payo¤ is SW (Late; Early) 
SW (Early; Early) = (A2+15252 468Ak+2727k2)=14400 > 0. And private rm
also benets by deviating to late and its incermental payo¤ is 2(Early; Late)  
2(Early; Early) = 87(A   2k)2=9800 > 0. Similarly (Late, Late) is not an equi-
librium because both rms have incentives to deviate. Incremental payo¤ to public
rm is SW (Early; Late) SW (Late; Late) = (9(A  2k)2  6162)=6300 > 0 and
incremental payo¤ to private rm, while deviating to early is, 2(Late; Early)  
2(Late; Late) = ((A  2k)2 + 2)=400 > 0.
ii) (Early, Late) is indeed an equilibrium since no rm has the incentive to
deviate. Deviation payo¤ to rm 1 is SW (Late; Late)  SW (Early; Late) =
(6162 9(A 2k)2)=6300 < 0 and deviation payo¤ to rm 2 is 2(Early; Early) 
2(Early; Late) =  87(A   2k)2=9800 < 0. Playing (Late,Early) is another equi-
librium since deviation does not benet either of the rms. Deviation payo¤to public
rm is SW (Early; Early)  SW (Late; Early) =  (117(A 2k)2+15252)=14400 <
0 and deviation payo¤ to private rm is 2(Late; Late) 2(Late; Early) =  ((A 
2k)2 + 2)=400 < 0:
2.8 Information acquisition
In this section, we derive equilibria of the costly information acquisition stage
which appears before the timing stage. We divide the variance of the demand shock
into ve regions. In the rst region, where rms face high uncertainty, specically
when variance of the demand shock 2  (A2 + 2Ak + k2) =24, following both rms
have acquired information, there are two Stackelberg equilibria (Early, Late) and
(Late, Early) with either rm acting as the leader. While, following that neither of
the rms acquires information, they play Cournot in period two (Late, Late) in this
range and following that only public rm has acquired information, (Early, Late)
exists and given that only private rm has acquired information, only (Late, Early)
exists in this range. In the second region, A2=24  2 < (A2 + 2Ak + k2) =24, two
Stackelberg equilibria (Early, Late) and (Late, Early) exists in cases considered in
sections 2.5 and 2.6, while one Stackelberg equilibrium (Late, Early) exists in case
of section 2.7 and one Cournot equilibrium (Late, Late) exists in case discussed in
section 2.4.
In the third region, where variance 9A2=616  2 < A2=24; both types of
Stackelberg equilibria (Early, Late) and (Late, Early) exists in cases discussed in
sections 2.5 and 2.6, while one Stackelberg equilibrium (Late, Early) exists un-
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der cases considered in sections 2.4 and 2.7. In the fourth region where variance
(9A2   36Ak + 36k2) =616  2 < 9A2=616, both types of Stackelberg equilibria
(Early, Late) and (Late, Early) exist in all the cases except for the case where
the only private rm has acquired information. Given that only private rm has
acquired information, only one sequential equilibrium (Late, Early) exists in this
range. Last region, where 0  2 < (9A2   36Ak + 36k2) =616, there exists both
types of Stackelberg equilibria (Early, Late) and (Late, Early) exist in all four cases
discusses in the previous sections. With working on all the corresponding possi-
ble payo¤ tables in all the regions and checking all the possibilities of equilibria,
we derive the following result regarding Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the
information acquisition stage.
Proposition 7 (endogenous information acquisition ) The results of the over-
all game are: i) there is no pure strategy equilibrium where both rms acquire
information. ii) there is a pure strategy equilibrium where only public rm ac-
quire information and play sequentially in the subsequent game with public rm
acting as leader i¤ 2 maxf A2 + 700F + 250Ak   225k2; (3A2 + 448F +
160Ak   144k2)=32; 9(28F + 10Ak   9k2)=25g iii) there is a pure strategy equi-
librium where private rm acquire information while public rm does not and play
sequentially in the subsequent game with private rm acting as leader i¤ 2 
maxf A2 + 400F + 100Ak   100k2; 4(4F + Ak   k2); 9A2=616g iv(a)) there is a
pure strategy equilibrium where neither rm acquire information and play cournot
in the second period (late, late) i¤ maxf(13A2   1600F   550Ak + 525k2)=112;
A2=24g  2 <  A2 + 400F + 100Ak   100k2. iv(b)) there is a pure strategy
equilibrium where neither rm acquire information and play sequentially in which
public rm acts a leader i¤ 0  2 <min f9 ( 3A2 + 448F + 154Ak   147k2) =112;
9 (28F + 10Ak   9k2) =25; 9A2=616g. iv(c)) there is a pure strategy equilibrium where
neither of the rms acquires information and play sequentially in which private
rm acts a leader i¤ 0  2  minf3( 5A2 + 748F + 216Ak   216k2)=392;
(3A2 + 448F + 160Ak   144k2)=32; 16F + 4Ak   4k2; A2=24g.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the endogenous timing decisions of rms in a mixed
duopoly and examine whether an information advantaged rm has incentives to
become the market leader in a quantity-setting game. We consider a market for
homogeneous goods, where a publicly owned rm is competing against a domesti-
cally owned private rm while facing uncertain demand. The objective of the public
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rm is to maximize the social welfare, while private rm maximizes its own prot.
Firms decide to set their quantities in one of the two periods. The market demand
is stochastic in the sense that if rms make their output decisions in the rst pe-
riod without having any information about market demand, they, being risk-neutral
maximize the expected values of their corresponding objective functions. We allow
rms to have information asymmetry. Exact market demand is revealed before the
start of the second period thus one rmmay have a perishable information advantage
over the other.
By employing the framework of extended games with observable delay devel-
oped by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we summarize the results of endogenous
timing game as follows. Given that both rms know the exact realization of mar-
ket demand by acquiring information, two type of Stackelberg equilibria with either
rm acting as a leader coexist. The case where no rm has acquired information,
we nd two Stackelberg type equilibria in pure strategies with either rm acting
as leader coexist under the mild degree of variance of the demand shock. How-
ever, under a high degree of uncertainty of demand, rms endogenously decide to
produce in the second period thus competing in Cournot fashion. In the case of
asymmetric information where only the public rm has acquired costly informa-
tion about market demand, both type of Stackelberg equilibria coexist only for the
small degree of demand uncertainty. But, under high variance of the demand shock,
only one Stackelberg equilibrium exists in which the public rm acts as a market
leader. Under asymmetric information situations, it is not a strictly dominant strat-
egy for information advantaged rm to move early as opposed to the case of private
duopolies. A similar result emerges when the private rm is assumed to have ac-
quired costly information. For a smaller degree of demand uncertainty, both type of
Stackelberg equilibria coexist. However, under high demand volatility, only private
rm leadership Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Unless both rms have not acquired
information, we nd that rms in mixed duopoly always move in a sequential way
and dont choose the same period to compete in Cournot fashion.
We also consider rms to endogenously acquire costly information about the mar-
ket demand by adding an extra stage to the game. The results of the information
acquisition stage show that it is not optimal for both rms to acquire costly informa-
tion. This is in contrast to the prot maximizing rms case, where an equilibrium in
which both rms acquire information and play Cournot game in the period one ex-
ists as shown by Gilpatric and Li (2015). However, under highly uncertain demand
conditions, we nd that only one rm acquires the costly information and becomes
the leader in the market. So in the presence of high uncertainty, early information
of market demand helps the rm to endogenously act as a market leader. Under
low variance of the demand shock, no rm acquires information and two types of
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Stackelberg equilibria exist with either rm acting as a leader with some parame-
ter restrictions. An equilibrium outcome with certain parametric restrictions under
mild variance of demand shock also emerges where no rm acquires information
and then they choose quantities in the second period while competing in a Cournot
fashion.
In this chapter, we allow one private rm to compete against the public rm,
the model can be extended by adding more private rms. We work out with linear
demand function, however, it remains to see whether our results hold or otherwise by
using a more general demand function. Adding foreign private rms into the model
while competing against the public rm, is another possible extension. Another
way to extend our model is to introduce partial privatization of the public rm and
to see whether endogenous sequencing or the incentives for acquiring information
change or not. In the present model, rms are producing homogeneous products,
what happens when they are competing in a di¤erentiated goods market is another
question to explore.
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2.A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 7 (endogenous information
acquisition)
We briey sketch the proof of this proposition.
Case 1 (2  (A2 + 2Ak + k2) =24): As described in the main text, when the
variance of demand shock 2  (A2 + 2Ak + k2) =24, there are two Stackelberg
equilibria (Early, Late) and (Late, Early) in this range given that both rms have
acquired information. While, following that neither of the rms has acquired infor-
mation, they play Cournot in period two (Late, Late) in this range and following
that only the public rm has acquired information, only one Stackelberg equilibrium
(Early, Late) exists. Given that only private rm has acquired information, only one
Stackelberg equilibrium (Late, Early) exists in this range. Then, we have following
payo¤ tables:
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The di¤erence between above two tables originates from the payo¤s following
(acquire, acquire). In the rst table, payo¤s correspond to the (Early, Late) while
in table two, payo¤s correspond to (Late, Early) equilibrium. Working with these
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payo¤s tables, we nd that there is no pure strategy equilibrium where both of
the rms acquire information. There is a pure strategy equilibrium where only
public rm acquires information and play sequentially in the subsequent game
with public rm acting as a leader i¤ 2 maxf A2 + 700F + 250Ak   225k2;
(A2 + 2Ak + k2) =24. There is a pure strategy equilibrium where only private rm
acquires information and then play (Late, Early) i¤2 maxf A2+400F+100Ak 
100k2; (A2 + 2Ak + k2) =24g. There is a pure strategy equilibrium where neither of
the rms acquires information and play Cournot in the second period (late, late)
i¤ (A2 + 2Ak + k2) =24  2 <minf A2 + 400F + 100Ak   100k2; A2 + 700F +
250Ak   225k2g.
Case 2 ( A2=24  2 < (A2 + 2Ak + k2) =24): In this range of variance of
demand shock, (A2=24  2 < (A2 + 2Ak + k2) =24), two Stackelberg equilibria
(Early, Late) and (Late, Early) exist in cases considered in sections 2.5 and 2.6,
while one Stackelberg equilibrium (Late, Early) exists in case discussed in section
2.7 and one Cournot equilibrium (Late, Late) exists in the case discussed in section
2.4. So in this range of variance, in addition to the two payo¤ tables above, we have
following two tables as well.
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Working with these four payo¤tables, we nd that there is no pure strategy equi-
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librium where both rms acquire information. There is a pure strategy equilibrium
where public rm acquires information and play (Early, Late) i¤maxf A2+700F+
250Ak 225k2; A2=24g  2 < (A2+2Ak+k2)=24 and there is another pure strategy
equilibrium where private rm acquire information and subsequently acts as a leader
i¤maxf A2 + 400F + 100Ak   100k2; ( 3A2   448F   148Ak + 4k2)=3; A2=24g 
2 < (A2 + 2Ak + k2)=24. There is a pure strategy equilibrium where neither of
the rms acquires information and play Cournot in the second period (Late, Late)
i¤ f(13A2   1600F   550Ak + 525k2)=112; A2=24g  2 < minf A2 + 700F +
250Ak   225k2; (A2 + 2Ak + k2)=24; A2 + 400F + 100Ak   100k2g. Proceeding in
the same way, we can derive conditions for other regions of variances for di¤erent
type of equilibria as discussed in the main text under section 2.8, and combining all
the conditions, we get the Proposition 7.
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CHAPTER 3
Information acquisition and endogenous sequencing in mixed duopoly
with a foreign competitor
3.1 Introduction
In di¤erent parts of the world, the presence of publicly owned rms while com-
peting against foreign-owned private rms is evident in many industries like for
example health, education, telecommunication, insurance, banking, postal services
and transport among others. In the United States, Packing and over-night deliv-
ery industry is an example where we can observe public and private rms com-
pete together. Similarly, in the Norwegian oil industry, the publicly-owned Statoil
faces signicant competition from two foreign-owned private rms Esso Norge and
Norske Shell and in the telecom sector of the country, the state-owned Telenor has
many competing rms owned by di¤erent countries, Like, United States, France,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland etc.33 The market structure where public
rm competes against private rms is known as mixed oligopoly. The research on
mixed oligopoly gained momentum in the past decade or so, although the literature
on the subject is not new (see for example Merrill and Schneider (1966), Anderson
et al. (1997), and Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse (1989) among others).
Historically public rms have enjoyed monopoly in certain sectors in many coun-
tries but with the passage of time competition has increased with the participation
in the form domestic private rms and foreign-owned private rms. Many studies
have discussed the consequences of privatizing the public rm while competing in
the product market. And many of these studies exogenously assumed the order of
rms moves. Since assuming the di¤erent order of moves produces signicantly
di¤erent results, it is important to analyze the incentives of rms to endogenously
33See Fjell and Heywood (2002) for details.
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choose the order of moves. The endogenous determination of simultaneous versus
sequential moves in oligopolistic market structure got popularity since the seminal
work of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).34 In case of mixed oligopoly with one public
rm competing against many domestic private rms, the endogenous order of moves
was rst studied by Pal (1998). He shows that di¤erent order of moves carries sig-
nicant di¤erent welfare implications. And in mixed oligopoly when a public rm
has foreign-owned private competitors, to the best of our knowledge, Matsumura
(2003a) paper is the rst to investigate the endogenous timing decisions of rms. In
an environment, where uncertainty looms regarding market demand, rms choices to
become the market leader or follower in making strategic decisions are endogenous
in nature. And further, rms motivation to acquire costly information regarding
market demand conditions largely depends upon whether a rm is enjoying a lead-
ership position in a market or it is acting as a follower. For example, Raju and
Roy (2000) found that information has a great value under high uncertainty and
in more competitive industry. Moreover information is of great benet to the rm
acting as a market leader and competing in a Stackelberg fashion than competing
in a Bertrand way, however, they assume rms strategic position as market leader
to be exogenous.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on endogenous sequencing of moves
by rms in mixed duopoly, where a publicly-owned rm is competing against a
foreign-owned private rm, by exploring the role of information advantage by a rm
(an early information of uncertain market demand) to endogenously become a mar-
ket leader in a quantity setting game. We consider a market of homogeneous goods,
where a publicly owned rm is competing against a purely private rm. The public
rm maximizes the social welfare35 (the sum of its own prot and consumer surplus)
by optimally choosing its output which can be made in one of the two periods early
or late. While foreign-owned rm maximizing its own prot by optimally setting its
quantity in one of the two periods early or late. Firms face a linear and stochastic
inverse market demand function and if rms make their output decisions in the rst
period without having any information about actual market demand, they, being
risk-neutral maximize the expected value of their respective objective functions. We
assume that rms produce with quadratic cost functions. Exact market demand is
revealed to both rms before the start of the second period thus rms may have
34Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) propose two ways to endogenize the timing of moves by rms in
an oligopoly model; extended games with action commitment and extended games with observable
delays. In the observable delay games, rms pre-commit to the periods in which to produce in
pre-stage and then they play the actual game in one of the two periods by optimally choosing the
quantities in the periods committed earlier
35Since the foreign-owned private rm is assumed to remit all of its prot back to its home
country of origin, its prots are excluded from the objective function of the public rm.
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a perishable information advantage. We allow rms to have information asymme-
try about market demand. In order to endogenize the rms sequencing of moves,
we employ the framework of extended games with observable delay developed by
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In this framework, rms rst decide on the timings
of their moves and then commit to it in the action game played later. If both of the
rms commit to produce early in period one or both delay their output decisions to
the second period, they will compete in a standard Cournot fashion. But if one of
the rms commits to produce early while other delays its output, they will compete
in a Stackelberg fashion with rm producing early will act as a leader. In this case,
the rm acting as Stackelberg follower will observe the actual quantity produced
by the leading rm and it will set its output accordingly. We also consider rms
to endogenously acquire costly information about the market demand by adding an
extra stage to the game as in Gilpatric and Li (2015) and derive the conditions under
which it is optimal for rms to acquire costly information about market demand.
When both rms are exogenously assumed to have acquired costly information,
we show that both ((Early, Late) & (Late, Early)) Stackelberg equilibria with ei-
ther rm acting as a leader coexist. Given that no rm has acquired information, a
Stackelberg equilibrium in pure strategies with public rm acting as a leader exists
under a mild degree of variance of demand. In this case, there is another Stackelberg
equilibrium with private rm leadership but it exists only when there is no uncer-
tainty regarding demand. However high uncertainty of demand is accompanied by
rms to endogenously produce in the second period thus competing in a Cournot
fashion.36 In case of information asymmetry, when the only public rm is assumed to
have acquired costly information about market demand, a Stackelberg equilibrium
with public rm acting as a market leader always exists.37 However, Stackelberg
equilibrium with foreign-owned private rm leadership exists only when there is no
uncertainty regarding market demand.38 Under asymmetric information situations,
it is not a strictly dominant strategy for information advantaged rm to move early
as opposed to the case of private duopolies.39 When the private rm is assumed
to have acquired costly information, both Stackelberg equilibria ((Early, Late) &
(Late, Early)) co-exist only for a smaller degree of demand uncertainty. However,
in this case, under high variance of the demand shock, Stackelberg equilibrium with
36This case has been considered and studied by Anam et al. (2007).
37This type of Stackelberg equilibrium always exists irrespective of the level of uncertainty of
market demand reected by the variance of the stochastic intercept term.
38Specically, this type of Stackelberg equilibrium exists only when the variance of the stochastic
intercept term is zero.
39Gilpatric and Li (2015) conclude that in private duopoly, it a strictly dominant strategy
for information advantaged rm to move early, while for other information disadvantaged rm it
depends upon the uncertainty of market demand.
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foreign-owned private rm acting as a leader coexists with a Cournot equilibrium in
period two (Late, Late).
The results of the information acquisition stage reveal that it is not optimal
for both rms to acquire costly information. So, both rms acquiring information
(acquire, acquire) cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. This is in contrast to
the prot-maximizing duopoly case.40 However, under high uncertainty, we nd
that only one public rm acquires costly information and becomes the leader of the
market. So in the presence of high uncertainty, an early signal of market demand
helps the public rm to endogenously act as a market leader. We show that in
the information acquisition stage there is no equilibrium where only foreign-owned
private rm acquires costly information. However, under low variance of the demand
shock, no rm acquires information and subsequently, Stackelberg equilibrium with
public rm leadership emerges. There is another equilibrium where no one acquires
information and then compete in a Stackelberg fashion with foreign-owned private
rm acting as a leader but only when there is no uncertainty regarding market
demand.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We briey review literature in Sec-
tion 3.2 and discuss model formulation in Section 3.3. In the Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we
derive Nash equilibria of the timing game under no information and full information
(symmetric information) cases respectively. The results under the cases of asym-
metric information are discussed in Sections 3.6 and 3.7. We discuss information
acquisition stage in Section 3.8 and Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Firms choices regarding endogenous timing have been widely studied in the
industrial organization literature. There are two strands of literature which are rel-
evant to us. One stream of literature is related to the endogenous timing decisions
by rms in oligopolistic markets. The second line of research is related to the incen-
tives of rms to acquire costly market information. Many papers have considered
the moves by rms in an exogenous way. Since the di¤erent order of moves produces
signicantly di¤erent results, it is important to study the order of rms move en-
dogenously. The endogenous determination of simultaneous versus sequential moves
by rms in oligopoly got popularity since the seminal work of Hamilton and Slutsky
40Gilpatric and Li (2015) show that in private duopoly where rms sole objective is to maximize
their own prots, there is an equilibrium in which both rms acquire information and subsequently
compete in Cournot fashion early in period one.
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(1990). They propose two ways to endogenize the timing of moves by rms in an
oligopoly model; extended games with action commitment and extended games with
observable delays. In the observable delay games, rms pre-commit to the periods
in which to produce in pre-stage and then they play the actual game in one of the
two periods by optimally choosing the quantities in the periods committed earlier.41
First, we review some studies related to the endogenous timing of rms in pure
oligopolies. In a pure duopoly, Liu (2005) analyzes the strategic advantage of early
commitment while acting as a Stackelberg leader versus the benets of exibility and
being fully informed while acting as a Stackelberg follower. While facing uncertain
market demand, rms are exogenously assigned the roles of leader and follower.
When the true value of demand is quite high or quite low from its expected value,
he shows that rm prefers to remain exible while acting as a Stackelberg follower
and it earns a higher prot than being acting as a Stackelberg leader.42 However, the
rm prefers to play Stackelberg leadership strategy than playing Cournot strategy
supported by a large range of parameters.
In a private duopoly, Spencer and Brander (1992) analyze the endogenous tim-
ing decisions of rms (early commitment versus exible delay) in the presence of
uncertainty regarding market demand. Under low uncertainty, their results show
that rms prefer to compete in Cournot fashion in period one (early commitment).
They compete again in a Cournot fashion in period two when demand uncertainty
is quite high. They show that when only one of the rms is exogenously allowed to
become Stackelberg leader, it will do so when there is low uncertainty but it prefers
to compete in a Cournot fashion under high uncertainty.43
Mailath (1993) studies the role of asymmetric information in the quantity deci-
sions of prot-maximizing duopolist rms. In his model market demand is uncertain
and potentially, it can take three values high, medium and low. One of the rms
is exogenously allowed to have an information advantage over the other rm. The
41In pure oligopolies, Amir and Grilo (1999) derive the conditions on demand and cost functions
and nd that log-concavity of inverse demand function is su¢ cient to derive rms to play endoge-
nously Cournot in timing game. This holds irrespective of the shape of the cost function. On the
other hand, if inverse demand function is log-convex in nature, then rms reaction functions are
increasing and they behave in a Stackelberg fashion taking the role of both leader and follower
endogenously. However, it requires rms to produce their goods free of cost. Dowrick (1986) nds
that the slope of the reaction functions of the prot-maximizing rms plays the key role in agreeing
over the assigned roles as a leader or follower in the Stackelberg model. He shows that when reac-
tion functions are negatively sloped both of the rms prefers to take the role of Stackelberg leader.
If the rmsreaction functions are positively sloped, then if the role of leadership is preferred by
one rm then the other rm prefers to be a follower unless they face similar cost and demand
structures in that case both of the rms prefer being a follower to acting as a leader.
42A very low realized value of demand may lead to negative prot for the Stackelberg leader.
43In their model, if the rm prefers to become Stackelberg leader and moves early then it is
perfectly informed about the timing of the move of its opponent.
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informed rm has the choice to move early than the uninformed rm or it can set
its quantity simultaneously. In a stable equilibrium, the information advantaged
rm optimally chooses to become Stackelberg leader. He shows that, although the
informed rm could get an ex-ante higher prot while playing Cournot strategy, but
because of the stability requirements, the informed rm play Stackelberg strategy
and acts as a market leader. While allowing an uninformed rm to move, in a sim-
ilar model, Normann (1997) shows that another Stackelberg equilibrium under the
leadership of the uninformed rm exists. In the framework of extended games with
observable delay, Normann (2002) shows that in addition to the Stackelberg out-
comes with either rm acting as a market leader, the Cournot outcome supported
with a large range of parameters also emerges. In all of these papers, rms are
exogenously allowed to have information asymmetry.44
van Damme and Hurkens (1999) study the endogenous timing decisions of rms
in a pure duopoly while applying the framework of extended games with action
commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). They consider rms to face linear
demand and produce with constant marginal costs, however one rm has lower
marginal cost than the other rm. They show that both types of the Stackelberg
equilibria exist but Stackelberg equilibrium under the leadership of low-cost rm
only survives when the criterion of risk dominance of Harsanyi and Selton (1988) is
applied because early commitment is more costly for the high-cost rm. Shi (2015)
considers an environment, where, pure duopolist rms face an uncertain demand.
Firms have three options; to produce early in period one or costlessly wait and
produce in period two without having information about market demand or to do
costly market research. He shows that if market research is too costly or alternatively
too cheap, rms choose their quantities simultaneously. However, market leadership
endogenously emerges for the intermediate values of cost.
While exploring the role of information, Daughety and Reinganum (1994) analyze
the endogenous sequencing decisions of the rms in a signaling game, where the
slope of the market demand for homogenous goods can take possibly two values.
They allow ex-ante symmetric rms to acquire information and then decide to set
their quantities in one of two periods. The results show that asymmetry arises
in the equilibrium in the sense that only one rm acquires information and the
informed rm acts as a Stackelberg leader. Both rms dont acquire information in
the equilibrium unless it is free. Since the true market demand is never revealed to
the follower, rms play a signaling game. In a pure duopoly model with horizontally
di¤erentiated goods, where rms face cost uncertainty, Albaek (1990) found that a
44Normann (1997) builds on the framework of extended games with action commitment while
Normann (2002) applies the framework of extended games with observable delay introduced by
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
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Natural Stackelberg Situation emerges in quantity competition and rm with higher
cost variance acts as a Stackelberg leader in the equilibrium.45 To see more research
on the role of information and incentives for rms to share information see for
example Raju and Roy (2000) and Yan et al. (2012).46
Pal (1998) is the rst author to investigate the issue of simultaneous versus se-
quential moves in a quantity setting game by rms in a mixed oligopoly. In his
model, one public rm has many domestic private competitors and they produce
homogenous goods with constant marginal costs. The public rm produces at a
higher cost thus being less e¢ cient. He shows that two types of Stackelberg equi-
libria coexist; the one in which public rm acts as a leader and the other in which
private rm acts as a leader. When more than two periods are added to the model,
he shows that all private rms decide to produce early in period one while public
rm produces afterward.47 But, social welfare is higher in the Stackelberg equilib-
rium where the public rm acts as a follower. However, Matsumura (2003a) found a
Stackelberg outcome where the public rm acts as a leader when competing against
a foreign-owned private rm. This outcome is socially e¢ cient as opposed to the Pal
(1998). By allowing two periods of production, Matsumura (2003b) investigated the
endogenous order of moves of rms in a mixed duopoly. He nds that multiple equi-
libria exist including Cournot type and Stackelberg type equilibrium with private
rm acting as a leader. However, he shows that no Stackelberg type equilibrium
with public rm acting as a leader exists. By adding small inventory cost into the
model, he claims that unique Stackelberg type equilibrium with public rm acting
as a follower exists. In these papers market demand is deterministic thus rms face
no uncertainties.
By using the framework of extended games with observable delay, Lu (2006) ana-
45In his model, both rms know the distribution of costs but they do not know the actual values
of their own as well as their opponents costs. A Natural Stackelberg Situation is dened as the
situation, where both rms agree on assigning the role of leadership to one rm and the role of
following to the other rm and further, both rms prefer this situation over Nash.
46Raju and Roy (2000) studied the value of information and they found that it is of great value
under high demand uncertainty and in more competitive industry represented by high product
substitutability. Moreover, in private duopoly, information benets more to the rm acting as a
market leader and competing in a Stackelberg fashion than competing in a Bertrand way. However,
they assume rms strategic position as market leader to be exogenous. In a game theoretic model,
Yan et al. (2012) study the incentives of an upstream manufacturer to share information with
downstream retailers di¤ering in their market shares or positions. They nd that it is optimal for
the manufacturer to share information with one small and less dominant retailer.
47Jacques (2004) claims that this result is sensitive to the number of private rms. specically,
he shows that this result holds only when the number of private rms ¬s greater than or equal
to two. When there is singly private rms competing against the public rm, there is another
equilibrium in which public rm chooses period one and private rm follows. Lu (2007) highlights
the another sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in which all private rm make their quantity choices
in any period except the last one while public rm acts as a follower.
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lyzes the endogenous timing decisions of rms in a quantity-setting mixed oligopoly.
He considers a homogenous goods market where one public rm is competing against
many domestic private rms and many foreign-owned private rms. His results show
that public rm optimally decides not to become the leader of the all foreign-owned
private rms while it chooses to be the follower of all the domestic private rms.
The number of domestic private rms and the number of foreign-owned private rms
is important for the existence of multiple equilibria in his model. Bárcena-Ruiz and
Garzón (2010) study the endogenous timing decisions of rms in a mixed duopoly
where one semipublic rm is competing against many private rms in a quantity
setting game. They consider rms to be equally e¢ cient and produce homogenous
goods with constant marginal cost. Firms decide on the timings of their moves in
observable delay games of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). They show that Cournot
outcome emerges as the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in this environment
which is in contrast to the result in Pal (1998).
Lu (2011) analyzes the endogenous timing of moves by rms in mixed oligopoly
when the objective of private rms is to maximize the relative prots rather than the
absolute prots. He considers all rms to produce homogenous good with constant
marginal cost while facing linear demand function and the public rm is less e¢ cient
than private rms in his model. His results reveal that simultaneous move cannot
be sustained as an equilibrium and two type of Stackelberg equilibria emerge; the
one in which public rm acts as a leader and in the other equilibrium it acts as a
follower. He shows that in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with public rm acting
as a leader, social welfare increase when private rms maximize relative prots but
relative prot maximizing behavior of private rms has no e¤ect on social welfare
when in the equilibrium, the public rm acts as a follower.
Anam et al. (2007) investigate the endogenous timing decisions of the rms in
mixed duopoly when rms face uncertainty regarding market demand. By using
the framework developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), they nd that multiple
equilibria in the quantity-setting game exist in a mixed duopoly. Specically, they
show that along with two Stackelberg outcomes with either public and private rm
acting as a leader, Cournot outcome also appears, where both rms produce in
period two when uncertainty is resolved. However social welfare is higher when the
private rm takes the role of leader and public rm follows thus conrming the result
in Pal (1998). Moreover, when the public rm is competing against a foreign private
rm, they show that under moderate uncertainty, public rm act as a leader and
this outcome is socially e¢ cient as well in line with Matsumura (2003a). However
in their model, there is no role of information, rms are homogeneous in terms of
the level of information about market demand.
We build our model on Gilpatric and Li (2015). In their model, two prot-
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maximizing rms, while, facing uncertain market demand, decide on the timing to
produce and if a rm chooses to produce in period two, it becomes fully informed
about market demand before the start of the period two. They allow rms to have
information asymmetry and that it is a strictly dominant strategy for an information
advantaged rm to move early. However, the timing decision of information disad-
vantaged rm depends on the variance of the demand shock. They show that when
the variance of the demand shock is high, the informed disadvantaged rm acts as a
follower and becomes fully informed so information asymmetry endogenously leads
to a Stackelberg market structure. However, a standard Cournot outcome in period
one appears when the variance is low. They also allow rms to endogenously acquire
information and they nd that when the variance of demand shock is high, both
rms acquire information and play Cournot in period one. For the medium range
of the variance, they show that only one of the rms acquires costly information,
however, endogenous leadership only arises when there is a signicant di¤erence be-
tween the xed costs of acquiring information between the rms. We apply their
model set up to the mixed duopoly market structure where a public rm competes
with a foreign-owned private rm.48
In a di¤erentiated duopoly, where rms face uncertain demand, Gilpatric and
Li (2016) analyze the endogenous order of moves in the price-setting game. They
show that in the equilibrium, information advantaged rm always acts as a leader
and the less informed rm behaves as a follower to perfectly known with market
demand since both rms know the actual market demand in the second period.
While endogenizing the information acquisition decisions, they show that both rms
acquiring information cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
In the context of mixed duopoly, Tomaru and Kiyono (2010) investigated the en-
dogenous timing decisions of the rms, facing increasing marginal costs in a quantity
setting game. They show that two types of sequential equilibrium coexist with ei-
ther rm acting as Stackelberg leader thus their results conform to the ndings of
Pal (1998) even when rms face increasing marginal costs.49 While Lu and Poddar
(2009) nd that simultaneous move cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash
48It is well-known result in the mixed oligopoly that the public rm will monopolize over all
the production if the public rm is equally e¢ cient as the private rm and produces with constant
marginal cost (see for example Bárcena-Ruiz (2012)). In order to avoid this problem, we assume
that both rms produce by using quadratic cost functions while Gilpatric and Li (2015) allow rms
to produce with the constant marginal costs since they deal with only prot-maximizing rms. Pal
(1998) deals with this problem by assuming that public rm produces with a positive constant
marginal cost while the private rm has zero marginal cost. In Anam et al. (2007) both rms
produce with quadratic costs.
49In their model, inverse demand function is deterministic and more general rather than linear
and rms face similar convex cost functions. While in Pal (1998) and Matsumura (2003a) rms
face linear inverse demand functions and have constant marginal cost.
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equilibrium in mixed duopoly when rms are endogenously deciding on capacity
then quantity. Their results are also in line with the ndings on endogenous timing
in mixed duopoly cited earlier that multiple equilibria can exist where either type
of rm acts as a leader. Naya (2015) studied the endogenous timing decisions of
a partially privatized rm in a quantity setting while competing against a private
domestic rm in a di¤erentiated goods market. The results reveal that under a
lower degree of privatization, both types of sequential equilibria exist with either
rm acting as Stackelberg leader. Under medium level of privatization, only one
equilibrium exists with private rm acting as a leader while under the higher level
of privatization rms compete in Cournot fashion endogenously.
While investigating the endogenous timing decisions of rms in a mixed duopoly,
Matsumura and Ogawa (2017a) nd that in the presence of a signicant negative
production externality, rms endogenously choose to compete in Cournot fashion
as opposed to Pal (1998) and Matsumura (2003a) among others. Under negative
externality, they show that rms make sequential moves when competing in prices,
again in contrast to the standard ndings in the literature on mixed oligopoly. They
conclude that in the presence of a signicant negative externality, mixed duopolies
behave in the same way as private duopolies in the endogenous timing game. While
introducing product di¤erentiation into the model as in Dixit (1979), Matsumura
and Ogawa(2017b) studied the endogenous timing decisions of rms in a mixed
duopoly in quantity-setting game. They found that two Stackelberg equilibria with
either rm acting as a leader exist. However, from the social welfare perspective, it
is desirable when public rm acts as a follower. They also show that the equilibrium
with public rm acting as the leader is risk-dominant and robust under the high
degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation. While competing with foreign-owned
private rm, they show that two sequential move equilibria; public leadership and
foreign-owned private rm leadership exists. But social welfare is higher under the
leadership of public rm and it is risk-dominant and thus a robust equilibrium.50
In all of the papers cited above, no one study the role of information advantage
on the endogenous timing decisions of the rms in the mixed oligopoly. In this
chapter, we ll this gap in a mixed duopoly where a public has a foreign-owned
private competitor.
In a mixed duopoly, Ogawa and Kazuhiko (2006) study the price setting behav-
ior of rms when they are competing in a homogeneous goods market. Firms are
exogenously assigned the roles of leader and the follower. They show that price is
50In a di¤erent context, Zhang and Li (2013) analyze the timing of location decisions of a
public and a private rm in a Hotelling-type model, with rms facing the uncertainty regarding
the locations of the consumer. They show that when the degree of uncertainty is too high, both
rm delay their entrance to the market while they nd that there is no equilibrium accompanied
with the small degree of uncertainty.
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higher under the leadership of private rm than under the leadership of the public
rm. With some parametric restrictions, this price is even higher than the Nash
price set simultaneously. However, the public rm sets the same price as set by the
private rm irrespective of the role it enjoys. Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) considers the
mixed duopoly and di¤erentiated goods market to analyze the endogenous moves
of rms in the pricing game. He shows that rms in mixed duopoly set their prices
simultaneously as opposed to the private duopoly where rms set their prices se-
quentially.
3.3 Model
We study a simple mixed duopoly model, where a publicly owned rm (rm
1), has a foreign-owned private competitor. Firms are competing in a homogenous
goods market and face a stochastic linear inverse demand function of the following
form:
p = A+    qi   qj; (85)
In the equation (85) above,  is a stochastic term in nature. Specically,  is a
random variable having a continuous c.d.f   F (:) with the properties E [ ] = 0
and var [ ] = 2 > 0:
Both rms are making decisions on the timing of production which can be made
in period one (Early) or in period two (Late). In order to analyze the endogenous
sequence of moves, we apply the framework of extended games with observable delay
developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In the extended game with observable
delay, rms simultaneous decide on the timing of their moves in the pre-stage and
then make their production decisions according to the timing committed earlier. A
standard Cournot outcome (Early, Early) or (Late, Late) will emerge if both of the
rms have opted to produce in period or in period two in the pre-stage. While they
will compete in Stackelberg fashion in the output game if they both have committed
to produce in di¤erent periods.
Since market demand is uncertain, we allow rms to acquire information about
market demand through a costly market research as in Gilpatric and Li (2015). If a
rm has acquired information, it knows the exact realized value  before the start of
production period one. Following the literature, we assume that, to the uninformed
rm, demand uncertainty is resolved before the start of the period two. So the
informed rm has a perishable informational advantage over the uninformed rm.
Firms acquire information at a xed cost F > 0 and it also increases the marginal
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cost of the rm by k > 0. Both rms produce their products with quadratic cost
function which takes the following form:
Cj (qj) = Ijkqj +
q2j
2
; (86)
where,
Ij =
8<:1; if rm j acquires information0; otherwise (87)
The prot function of rm j is as follows:
j =

A+    qj   q0i

qj   Cj (qj) ; (88)
where,
q
0
i =
8<:qi (qj) ; if rm i moves after rm jqi; otherwise (89)
Since rm 1 is publically owned, its objective is to maximize social welfare which
is the sum of its own prot and consumer surplus. The prot of rm 2 is not included
in the social welfare calculations because it is a foreign-owned private rm and it
remits all of its prot back to its home country. Hence social welfare is:
SW = 1 + CS (90)
We use the expected value of consumer surplus as a measure of consumer welfare
irrespective of whether the rms have acquired information about market demand
or otherwise.51 Hence, consumer surplus is written as:
E [CS] = E

A(q1 + q2)  (q1 + q2)
2
2
  p1q1   p2q2

(91)
Using inverse demand function and after simplication, we have:
E [CS] = (q1 + q2)
2=2 (92)
51Anam et al. (2007) use expected consumer surplus as a measure of consumer welfare. If
consumers are risk-neutral and face a demand whose income elasticity is zero, then Stennek (1999)
claim that expected consumer surplus is an appropriate measure for the welfare of consumers in
uncertain environments. However, these conditions do not hold empirically all the time. Schlee
(2008) also supports this idea that expected consumer surplus is a fairly good measure of consumer
welfare under uncertainties.
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The gure 2 below explains how the game is being played. In the rst stage,
which we call as information acquisition stage, rms simultaneously and endoge-
nously decide on to acquire costly information about market demand in a non-
cooperative way. At the end of this stage, rms decisions are announced and become
common knowledge. As described before, to study the endogenous timing decisions,
rms play observable delay games of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). After the in-
formation acquisition stage, rms simultaneously and non cooperatively decide on
the timing of their production decisions and strictly commit to it. At the end of
this stage (we call it as timing choice or commitment stage), rms choices on the
timings of their production are announced and become common knowledge. In the
next stage (production or action stage), rms make their production decisions ac-
cording to timing choices made earlier. If in the timing choice stage, both of the
rms decided to produce early in period one, production takes place only in the
period one of the production stage and after that consumers make their purchases.
But if they both have opted to produce in a di¤erent period, the leader makes his
production decisions in the period one and follower produces in the period two of
the production stage. In the last stage, consumers make their purchase decisions
and the market clears.
Figure 2: Sequence of events
In the section 3.4 below, we exogenously maintain the assumption that neither
of the rms has acquired information (thus both uninformed), while in section 3.5,
we exogenously assume that both of the rms have acquired information (thus both
informed) and study their endogenous order of moves. In the section 3.6 below, we
exogenously assume that only the public rm has acquired costly information and
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while in the section 3.7, we assume that only the private rm has acquired costly
information and we examine the rms endogenous choices regarding the timings of
their moves. We solve the model by using backward induction. In the section 3.8,
we study the rms choices on acquiring costly information.
3.4 No rm has acquired information
In this section, we assume that both rms have not acquired costly information
but however, they will learn about the realized value of market demand before the
start of the period. In this case, both rms will optimally choose their respective
quantities by simultaneously maximizing the expected values of the following pay
o¤ functions, if they both decided to produce in period one.
E (SW ) =
Z
(A+    q1   q2) q1dF ( ) + E (CS)  C1 (q1) ; (93)
E (2) =
Z
(A+    q1   q2) q2dF ( )  C2 (q2) ; (94)
Since both rms have not acquired information, Ii = 0 holds and so there are no
k terms in the above functions. Taking FOC and simultaneously solving them, we
get following optimal quantities, if they both rms have committed to produce in
period one:
q1 =
1
2
A; q2 =
1
6
A; (95)
Their respective ex-ante expected payo¤s are:
E (SW ) =
19
72
A2; (96)
E (2) =
1
24
A2: (97)
If both the rms choose to compete in Cournot fashion in period two, they
will learn the actual realization of market demand shock before the start of period
two. Simultaneous maximization of above payo¤ functions by taking into account
the realized value of demand shock as  0, we get following optimal quantities and
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ex-ante expected payo¤s:
q1 =
1
2
(A+  0); q

2 =
1
6
(A+  0); (98)
E (SW ) =
19
72
A2 +
19
72
2; (99)
E (2) =
1
24
A2 +
1
24
2: (100)
Now suppose that the public rm is committed to produce in period one, while
rm 2 produces in period two, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion in which the
public rm acts as a leader while rm 2 acts as a follower. Solving from backward
induction, we get following optimal quantities:
ql1 =
8
17
A; qf2 =
9
51
A+
1
3
 0; (101)
In this case, their corresponding payo¤s in expected terms are as follows:
E (SW ) =
9
34
A2 +
1
18
2; (102)
E (2) =
27
578
A2 +
1
6
2: (103)
If the foreign private rm has opted to produce in period one and public rm
produces in period two, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion in which private rm
acts as a leader, while public rm behaves as a follower. Their optimal quantities
and payo¤s in expected terms are:
qf1 =
1
2
(A+  0); q
l
2 =
1
6
A; (104)
E (SW ) =
19
72
A2 +
1
4
2; (105)
E (2) =
1
24
A2: (106)
The table below summarizes the ex-ante expected payo¤ to the players.
Firm 2
Early Late
Firm 1 Early 19A
2
72
; A
2
24
9A2
34
+ 
2
18
; 27A
2
578
+ 
2
6
Late 19A
2
72
+ 
2
4
; A
2
24
19A2
72
+ 19
2
72
; A
2
24
+ 
2
24
Table 8: Payo¤ matrix when both rms are uninformed
By straightforward calculations based on above payo¤ table, we nd Nash equi-
libria of endogenous timing game in pure strategies and results are recorded in the
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following proposition.
Proposition 8 (both rms are not informed) Given that no rm has acquired
costly information, the results of endogenous timing game are : i) there is no equi-
librium in which rms produce in the period 1 ii) public rm leadership (Early, Late)
appears as a pure strategy equilibrium i¤ 0  2  A2=255. ii¬) private rm lead-
ership (Late, Early) emerges as a pure strategy equilibrium i¤ 2 = 0. iv) there
is a pure strategy equilibrium with both rms producing in period 2 (Cournot) i¤
2  A2=255:
Proof. For proof see Proposition 2 in Anam et al. (2007).
3.5 Both rms have acquired information
In this section, we assume that both rms have exogenously acquired information
( Ii = 1 holds for both rms) and are thus informed about the actual realization
of market demand before the start of period 1. Hence by knowing exactly, the
realization of random intercept of demand as  0, the objective functions of both
rms are:52
SW = (A+  0   q1   q2) q1   C1 (q1) + E (CS) ; (107)
2 = (A+  0   q1   q2) q2   C2 (q2) : (108)
Taking FOCs and simultaneously solving them yields the following optimal quan-
tities, if both rms have opted to produce either in period 1 or in period 2:
q1 =
1
2
(A  k +  0); q2 =
1
6
(A  k +  0); (109)
In this case, their respective ex-ante expected payo¤s are:
E (SW ) =
19
72
(A  k)2 + 19
72
2; (110)
E (2) =
1
24
(A  k)2 + 1
24
2: (111)
If rm 1 (public rm) has opted to produce in period one, while rm 2 committs to
produce in period 2, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion in which public rm acts
as a leader while foreign-owned private rm acts as a follower. We solve the model
52Since the xed cost of acquiring information F is a sunk cost, so it is excluded from optimiza-
tion.
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by using backward induction and rst solve the followers problem which gives the
reaction function of rm 2 as q2(q1) = (A   k +  0   q1)=3. Firm 1 by taking into
account the reaction function of rm 2, maximizes its objective function as specied
in equation (107). Optimal quantities of the leader and the follower are:
ql1 =
8
17
(A  k +  0); qf2 =
3
17
(A  k +  0); (112)
Corresponding expected payo¤s are as follows:
E (SW ) =
9
34
(A  k)2 + 9
34
2; (113)
E (2) =
27
578
(A  k)2 + 27
578
2: (114)
If rm 2 has opted to produce in period one and rm 1 chooses to produce
in period two, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion with foreign-owned private
rm acting as a leader while public rm as the follower. Again by using backward
induction, optimal quantities and their respective payo¤s in expected terms are as
follows: :
qf1 =
1
2
(A  k +  0); ql2 =
1
6
(A  k +  0); (115)
E (SW ) =
19
72
(A  k)2 + 19
72
2; (116)
E (2) =
1
24
(A  k)2 + 1
24
2: (117)
The table below summarizes the payo¤ to the players in expected terms.
Firm 2
Early Late
Firm 1 Early 19(A k)
2
72
+ 19
2
72
; (A k)
2
24
+ 
2
24
9(A k)2
34
+ 9
2
34
; 27(A k)
2
578
+ 27
2
578
Late 19(A k)
2
72
+ 19
2
72
; (A k)
2
24
+ 
2
24
19(A k)2
72
+ 19
2
72
; (A k)
2
24
+ 
2
24
Table 9: Payo¤ matrix when both rms are informed
The following proposition presents the main result of this section about Nash
equilibria in pure strategies in endogenous timing game.
Proposition 9 (both rms have acquired information) Given that both rms
have acquired information, then the results of endogenous timing game are: i) si-
multaneous moves cannot be sustained as an equilibrium ii) there are two Stackelberg
equilibria with either rm acting as a leader i¤ 2  0.
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Proof. i) (Early, Early) can not be an equilibrium because the foreign-owned
private rm gets higher payo¤ by deviating to late and its incermental payo¤ is
2(Early; Late)   2(Early; Early) = 35((A   k)2 + 2)=6936 > 0 and in this
case public rm is indi¤erent between playing Early and Late given that foreign-
owned private rm is playing Early since SW (Early; Early) = SW (Late; Early).
Similarly (Late, Late) is not an equilibrium because public rm has incentive to
deviate and its incremental payo¤ is SW (Early; Late) SW (Late; Late) = ((A 
k)2 + 2)=1224 > 0 and foreign-owned private rm remains indi¤erent between
playing Late and Early since 2(Late; Late) = 

2(Late; Early).
ii) Straightforward calculations reveal that (Early, Late) is indeed an equilib-
rium since no rm has the incentive to deviate. Deviation payo¤ to rm 1 is
SW (Late; Late)  SW (Early; Late) =  ((A   k)2 + 2)=1224 < 0 and devia-
tion payo¤ to rm 2 is 2(Early; Early)   2(Early; Late) =  (35((A   k)2 +
2)=6936) < 0. Playing (Late,Early) is another equilibrium since deviation does not
strictly benet either of the rms because SW (Early; Early) = SW (Late; Early)
and 2(Late; Late) = 

2(Late; Early).
3.6 Only public rm has acquired information
In this section, we assume that only public rm has acquired information (I1 = 1)
and is thus informed about market demand realizations before the start of period
one and rm 2 having information disadvantage (I2 = 0) over the public rm, will
maximize the expected prot if it chooses to produce in period one. Objective
functions of the rms will be as follows:
SW = (A+  0   q1   q2) q1   C1 (q1) + E (CS) ; (118)
E (2) =
Z
(A+    q1   q2) q2dF ( )  C2 (q2) : (119)
Given that only public rm has acquired information, their optimal quantities
and payo¤s in expected terms are as follows, if both the rms have opted to produce
early in period one:
q1 =
1
2
(A  k +  0) ; q2 =
1
6
(A+ k) ; (120)
E (SW ) =
1
72
(19A2   34Ak + 19k2) + 18
72
2; (121)
E (2) =
1
24
(A+ k)2: (122)
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Since at the start of period two, rm 2 will also learn the realized value of market
demand shock, they will choose following optimal quantities while competing in
Cournot fashion in period two.
q1 =
1
2
(A  k +  0) ; q2 =
1
6
(A+ k +  0) ; (123)
Their corresponding payo¤s in expected terms are as follows:
E (SW ) =
1
72
(19A2   34Ak + 19k2) + 19
72
2; (124)
E (2) =
1
24
(A+ k)2 +
1
24
2: (125)
If the public rm is committed to produce early in period one and rm 2 has
opted to produce late in period two, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion in which
public rm acts as a leader while rm 2 follows. Their optimal quantities are:
ql1 =
1
17
(8A  9k + 8 0) ; qf2 =
3
17
(A+ k +  0) : (126)
In this case, their respective ex-ante expected payo¤s are written as:
E (SW ) =
1
34
(9A2   16Ak + 9k2) + 9
34
2; (127)
E (2) =
27
578
(A+ k)2 +
27
578
2: (128)
Now if the private rm has opted to produce early in period one and public rm
commits to produce late in period two, they compete in a Stackelberg fashion in
which private rm acts as a leader while public rm behaves as a follower. Here, the
private rm will maximize its expected prot by taking into account the reaction
function of the public rm. The optimal quantities and expected payo¤s are:
qf1 =
1
2
(A  k +  0) ; ql2 =
1
6
(A+ k) ; (129)
E (SW ) =
1
72
 
19A2   34Ak + 19k2+ 18
72
2; (130)
E (2) =
1
24
(A+ k)2: (131)
The table below shows the ex-ante expected payo¤s to the players.
We nd pure strategy Nash equilibria of the endogenous timing game and sum-
marize the discussion of this section in the proposition below.
Proposition 10 (only public rm has acquired information) Given that only
public rm has acquired costly information, then in the endogenous timing game i)
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Firm 2
Early Late
Firm 1 Early (19A
2 34Ak+19k2)
72
+ 18
2
72
; (9A
2 16Ak+9k2)
34
+ 9
2
34
;
(A+k)2
24
27(A+k)2
578
+ 27
2
578
Late (
19A2 34Ak+19k2)
72
+ 18
2
72
; (19A
2 34Ak+19k2)
72
+ 19
2
72
;
(A+k)2
24
(A+k)2
24
+ 
2
24
Table 10: Payo¤ matrix when only the public rm is informed
simultaneous move cannot be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. ii) there is a pure
strategy Stackelberg equilibrium in which the public rm acts as a leader i¤ 2  0.
ii¬) there is another pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium with private rm acting as
a leader i¤ 2 = 0.
Proof. i) (Early, Early) is not an equilibrium since the foreign-owned private
rm has the incentive to deviate and can get higher payo¤s. Its incremental payo¤ is
2(Early; Late) 2(Early; Early) = (35(A+k)2+3242)=6936 > 0. However, the
public rm is indi¤erent between playing Early and Late since SW (Early; Early)
= SW (Late; Early). (Late, Late) is not an equilibrium since public rm has in-
centive to deviate and incremental payo¤ to public rm is SW (Early; Late)  
SW (Late; Late) = ((A + k)2 + 2)=1224 > 0. While in this case, foreign-owned
private rm has no incentive to deviate because 2(Late; Late) > 

2(Late; Early).
ii) (Early, Late) is an equilibrium since no rm has the incentive to deviate. Devi-
ation payo¤ to public rm is SW (Late; Late)  SW (Early; Late) =  ((A+ k)2+
2)=1224 < 0 and deviation payo¤to rm 2 is2(Early; Early) 2(Early; Late) =
 (35(A+ k)2 + 3242)=6936 < 0.
iii) For (Late, Early) to be an equilibrium, we require that both rms have no
incentives to deviate unilaterally. Since SW (Late; Early) = SW (Early; Early);
deviation does not strictly benet to the public rm because it is indi¤erent between
playing Late and Early given that foreign-owned private rm is playing Early. And
foreign rm does not prefer to deviate as long as 2 = 0 because 2 (Late; Late) 
2 (Late; Early) = 
2=4.
3.7 Only foreign-owned private rm has acquired information
In this section, we assume that only private rm has acquired costly information
(I2 = 1) and it knows the exact realization of the market demand shock. While
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public rm having information disadvantage (I1 = 0), will learn the realized value
of demand shock before the start of period two if it opts to defer its production to
period two. If both the rms have committed to produce early in period one, their
objective functions, in this case, can be written as:
E (SW ) =
Z
(A+    q1   q2) q1dF ( )  C1 (q1) + E (CS) ; (132)
2 = (A+  0   q1   q2) q2   C2 (q2) : (133)
Since rms are playing Cournot game (Early, Early), the public rm will maxi-
mize its payo¤ in expected terms while the foreign-owned private rm will maximize
its payo¤ in actual terms since it knows the exact market demand shock. Following
are the optimal quantities and their corresponding ex-ante expected payo¤s, if both
of the rms have opted to produce early in period one:
q1 =
1
2
A; q2 =
1
6
(A  2k + 2 0) ; (134)
E (SW ) =
1
72
(19A2   4Ak + 4k2) + 4
72
2; (135)
E (2) =
1
24
(A  2k)2 + 4
24
2: (136)
But if the rms simultaneously produce in period two and play Cournot game
(Late, Late), the public rm will also learn the realized value of demand shock as
 0 before the start of period two. Simultaneous maximization yields the following
optimal quantities and corresponding payo¤s in expected terms:
q1 =
1
2
(A+  0) ; q

2 =
1
6
(A  2k +  0) ; (137)
E (SW ) =
1
72
(19A2   4Ak + 4k2) + 19
72
2; (138)
E (2) =
1
24
(A  2k)2 + 1
24
2: (139)
If the public rm has committed to produce early in period one, while foreign-
owned private rm produces in period two, the public rm acts as a Stackelberg
leader, while rm acts as Stackelberg follower. The public rm maximizes the ex-
pected value of social surplus while taking into account the optimal response function
of the foreign private rm. solving the problem from backward induction, we nd
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following optimal quantities and expected payo¤s.
ql1 =
1
17
(8A+ k) ; qf2 =
3
17
(A  2k) + 1
3
 0; (140)
E (SW ) =
1
306
(18A2   18Ak + 18k2) + 17
306
2; (141)
E (2) =
1
1734
(9A  18k)2 + 289
1734
2: (142)
The case, where foreign-owned private rm commits to produce early in period
one while acting as a Stackelberg leader and public rm acting as a Stackelberg
follower we get optimal leader-follower quantities and expected payo¤ as:
qf1 =
1
2
(A+  0) ; q
l
2 =
1
6
(A  2k +  0); (143)
E (SW ) =
1
72
 
19A2   4Ak + 4k2+ 19
72
2; (144)
E (2) =
1
24
(A  2k)2 + 1
24
2: (145)
Since public rm will learn the realized value of market demand shock before the
start of period two, its optimal quantity contains  0. Following table summarizes
the discussion of this section and presents the expected payo¤s to the players. Nash
equilibria of endogenous timing game in this case are recorded in the following
proposition.
Firm 2
Early Late
Firm 1 Early (19A
2 4Ak+4k2)
72
+ 4
2
72
; (18A
2 18Ak+18k2)
306
+ 17
2
306
;
(A 2k)2
24
+ 4
2
24
(9A 18k)2
1734
+ 289
2
1734
Late (
19A2 4Ak+4k2)
72
+ 19
2
72
; (19A
2 4Ak+4k2)
72
+ 19
2
72
;
(A 2k)2
24
+ 
2
24
(A 2k)2
24
+ 
2
24
Table 11: Payo¤ matrix when only the foreign-owned private rm is informed
Proposition 11 (only foreign-owned private rm has acquired information)
Assuming that only foreign-owned private rm has acquired costly information, then
the results of the endogenous timing game are: i) there is no equilibrium in which
rms produce simultaneously in period 1 (Early, Early). ii) there is a pure strategy
Stackelberg equilibrium in which public rm acts as a leader i¤ 2  (A  2k)2 =255.
ii¬) there is a pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium with private rm acting as a leader
i¤ 2  0. iv) there is another equilibrium in pure strategies where rms compete
in Cournot fashion in period 2 (Late, Late) i¤ 2  (A  2k)2 =255.
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Proof. i) Playing Cournot in period 1 (Early, Early) is not an equilibrium
because both rms have incentives to deviate and can get higher payo¤s. The
incremental payo¤ to the public rm is SW  (Late; Early) SW  (Early; Early) =
52=24 > 0. By deviating to late foreign-owned private rms incremental payo¤ is
2 (Early; Late)  2 (Early; Early) = (35(A  2k)2) =6936 > 0.
ii) For (Early, Late) to be an equilibrium we require that both rms have no
incentives to deviate. Firm 2 has no incentive to deviate because its incremental
payo¤ is 2 (Early; Early)   2 (Early; Late) =   (35(A  2k)2) =6963 < 0. And
by deviating, rm 1 receives SW (Late; Late)  SW (Early; Late) = (2252  (A 
2k)2)=1224 which is  0; i¤ 2  (A  2k)2 =255.
iii) Playing (Late,Early) is indeed an equilibrium since deviation does not ben-
et either of the rms. By deviating rm 1 receives the incremental payo¤ of
SW (Early; Early)  SW (Late; Early) =  52=24 < 0. While the foreign-owned
private rm is indi¤erent between playing Late and Early because 2(Late; Late) =
2(Late; Early) = ((A  2k)2 + 2)=24.
iv) Playing Cournot in period 2 (Late, Late) to be an equilibrium, we re-
quire that both rms do not deviate (unilaterally). Incremental payo¤ to rm 1
is SW (Early; Late)   SW (Late; Late) = (A   2k)2=1224   52=24 which is  0
i¤ 2  (A  2k)2 =255 and given that public rm plays Late, foreign-owned pri-
vate rm is indi¤erent between playing Late and Early because 2(Late; Early) =
2(Late; Late) = ((A  2k)2 + 2)=24, and thus it has no incentive to deviate.
3.8 Information acquisition
In this section, we endogenize the decisions of the rms to acquire costly in-
formation and discuss the incentives of the rms to engage in acquiring such in-
formation. Following Gilpatric and Li (2015), we add an additional stage to the
model that appears before the stage in which rms decide on the timing of the
move. In order to derive the results of the endogenous information acquisition
stage, we divide the variance of demand shock into three regions. First region
where 0  2 < (A  2k)2 =255, both types of Stackelberg equilibria (Early,
Late) and (Late, Early) exists in all of the four cases discussed in the previous
sections. In the second region, where variance lies between (A  2k)2 =255 and
A2=255 ((A  2k2) =255  2 < A2=255), both Stackelberg equilibria (Early, Late)
and (Late, Early) exists following both rms have acquired information, (Early,
Late) exists in the cases following neither of the rms has acquired information and
only public rm has acquired information. While in this region (Late, Early) and
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(Late, Late) exists in the case where the only private rm has acquired information.
In the last region, where rms face high uncertainty, specically when the vari-
ance of demand shock 2  A2=255, two Stackelberg equilibria (Early, Late) and
(Late, Early) with either rm acting as leader exists following both rms have ac-
quired information. While, following that neither of the rms acquires information,
they play Cournot in period two (Late, Late) in this range and following that only
public rm has acquired information, (Early, Late) exists and given that only pri-
vate rm has acquired information, (Late, Early) and (Late, Late) exists in this
range. Checking all the possibilities, we derive the following result regarding Nash
equilibria in pure strategies in the information acquisition stage.
Proposition 12 (endogenous information acquisition ) The results of the over-
all game are i) there is no pure strategy equilibrium where both rms acquire informa-
tion. ii) there is a pure strategy equilibrium where only public rm acquires informa-
tion (acquire, dont acquire) and subsequently playing in a Stackelberg fashion with
public rm acting as a leader (Early, Late) i¤ 2 maxf A2 + 1224F + 576Ak  
324k2; 9 (34F + 16Ak   9k2) =64; ( A2 + 1224F + 576Ak   324k2) =18g ii¬) there is
no pure strategy equilibrium where only foreign-owned private rm acquires infor-
mation. So (dont acquire, acquire) cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. iv) there
is a pure strategy equilibrium where neither of the rms acquires information (dont
acquire, dont acquire) and (a) play Cournot in the second period (Late, Late) i¤
A2=255  2 <  A2+1224F +576Ak 324k2. (b) play sequentially in which public
rm acts a leader (Early, Late) i¤ 0  2 <min f(A2 + 1224F + 578Ak   323k2) =238;
9 (34F + 16Ak   9k2) =64; A2=255g. (c) play sequentially in which private rm acts
a leader (Late, Early) i¤ 2  minf0; 4 (6F + Ak   k2) ; ( 35A2+6936F+1296Ak 
1296k2)=1156; ( A2 + 1224F + 576Ak   324k2)=18g.
3.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the role of information regarding uncertain market de-
mand in the mixed duopoly, where information advantaged rm may have incen-
tives to become the market leader in the quantity-setting game. We consider a
mixed duopoly market structure where a publicly-owned rm is competing against
a foreign-owned private rm. The objective of the public rm is to maximize the
social welfare, while foreign-owned private rm maximizes its own prot. Firms
produce homogeneous goods by using quadratic cost function. The market demand
is stochastic and if rms make their output decisions in the rst period without
having any information about market demand, they, being risk-neutral maximize
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the expected values of their respective objective functions. Following the literature,
we assume that exact market demand is revealed to both rms before the start of
the second period thus one rm may have a perishable information advantage over
the other. In order to study the endogenous sequence of moves, we apply the frame-
work of extended games with observable delay developed by Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990).
We show that when both rms are exogenously assumed to have acquired costly
information, two types of Stackelberg equilibria with either rm acting as a market
leader coexist. Given that no rm has acquired information, an equilibrium with
public rm leadership exists under a mild degree of variance of demand. However,
under high uncertainty of demand, rms endogenously choose to produce in the
second period while competing in a Cournot fashion. In this case, there is another
Stackelberg equilibrium with private rm leadership but it exists only when there
is no uncertainty regarding demand. In case of information asymmetry, when only
the public rm is assumed to have acquired costly information, a Stackelberg equi-
librium with public rm acting as a market leader always exists but equilibrium
with foreign-owned private rm leadership exists only when there is no uncertainty
regarding market demand. Under asymmetric information situations, it is not a
strictly dominant strategy for information advantaged rm to move early as op-
posed to the case of private duopolies as shown by Gilpatric and Li (2015). When
only the private rm is assumed to have acquired information, both Stackelberg
equilibria co-exist only for a smaller degree of demand uncertainty. However, in
this case, under high variance of the demand shock, Stackelberg equilibrium with
foreign-owned private rm leadership coexists with a Cournot equilibrium in period
two.
The results of the overall game by adding information acquisition stage reveal
that it is not optimal for both rms to acquire costly information which is in contrast
to the prot-maximizing duopoly case. We nd that under high uncertainty, only
the public rm acquires information and becomes the leader of the market. So in the
presence of high uncertainty, an early signal of market demand helps the public rm
to endogenously act as a market leader. However, under low variance of the demand
shock, no rm acquires information and subsequently, Stackelberg equilibrium with
public rm leadership emerges. There is another equilibrium where no rm acquires
information and then compete in a Stackelberg fashion with foreign-owned private
rm acting as a leader but only when there is no uncertainty regarding market
demand. We show that there is no equilibrium where only the foreign-owned private
rm acquires information.
In this paper we allow one foreign-owned private rm to compete against the
public rm, and our model can be extended by adding a domestic private rm. We
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work out with linear demand function, however, it remains to see whether our results
hold or otherwise by using a more general demand function. Another way to extend
our model is to introduce partial privatization of the public rm and to see whether
endogenous sequencing or the incentives for acquiring information change or not. In
the present model, rms are producing homogeneous products, what happens when
they are competing in a di¤erentiated goods market is another question to explore.
In this paper, rms produce by using quadratic cost functions and are perfectly
informed about their own as well as their rivals cost, adding uncertainty regarding
own cost and the rivals cost as in Albaek (1990) and studying the timing decisions
of rms is an important to explore which is left for future research.
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3.A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 12 (endogenous information
acquisition)
Here, we sketch the proof of this proposition.
Case 1 (2  A2=255): As described in the main text, when variance of demand
shock is 2  A2=255, following that both rms have acquired information, both
Stackelberg equilibria (Early, Late) and (Late, Early) exist. While, following that
neither of the rms has acquired information, they play cournot in period two (Late,
Late) in this range and given that only the public rm has acquired information,
only one Stackelberg equilibrium (Early, Late) exists in this range. Following that
only private rm have acquired information, two equilibria (Late, Early) and (Late,
Late) exist in this range. Then we have following four payo¤ tables:
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The di¤erence between above two tables originates from the payo¤s following (ac-
quire, acquire) and following (dont acquire, acquire). In the rst two table, payo¤s
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correspond to the (Early, Late) and in the last two tables, it corresponds to (Late,
Early) equilibrium following (acquire, acquire). While, following (dont acquire, ac-
quire), in the rst and third tables payo¤s corresponds to (Late, Early) equilibrium
and in the second and fourth tables payo¤s corresponds to (Late, Late) equilibrium.
Working with these payo¤s tables, we nd that there is no pure strategy equilibrium
where both rms acquire information. There is a pure strategy equilibrium where
only the public rm acquires information and subsequently, play (Early, Late) (pub-
lic rm acting as a leader) i¤ 2  maxf A2 + 1224F + 576Ak   324k2; A2=255g.
There is no pure strategy equilibrium where only the foreign-owned private rm ac-
quires information in this range. There is a pure strategy equilibrium where neither
of the rms acquires information and play Cournot in the second period (Late ,
Late) i¤ A2=255  2   A2 + 1224F + 576Ak   324k2.
Case 2 ((A  2k)2 =255  2 < A2=255): In this case, following that both of
the rms have not acquired information, they play (Early, Late) instead of (Late,
Late). That is the only di¤erence between this case and the case 1 discussed above.
So will have following four payo¤s matrices.
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Working with these four payo¤ tables we nd that again, there is no pure strat-
egy equilibrium where both rms acquire information. There is a pure strategy
equilibrium where only the public rm acquires information and then rms play
(Early, Late) i¤ maxf9(34F + 16Ak   9k2)=64; (A   2k)2=255g  2 < A2=255.
In this range of variance, there is no pure strategy equilibrium where only the
foreign-owned private rm acquires information. there is a pure strategy equilib-
rium where neither of the rms acquires information and play (Early, Late) i¤
(A   2k)2=255  2  minf9(34F + 16Ak   9k2)=64; A2=255g. Similarly, we
can derive conditions for the last region of variance (0  2 < (A  2k)2 =255) and
combining all the conditions, we get the Proposition 12.
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